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Abstract
A variety of studies have examined the role of economic structures in policing. These inquiries
offer insight into revenue-based law enforcement activities but are simultaneously limited by
blind spots in theorization. Reviewing these studies, it is apparent the criminal justice system can
and is used to gain revenue for a multitude of public and private organizations. Furthermore, it is
clear this is not a new phenomenon in the United States. Nor is the disparate impact of criminal
justice activity on segments of U.S. society such as poor or homeless citizens, minority
populations including black and latinx populations, and LGBTQ+ communities. Despite these
findings, there has been little attention put on how the role of capital in policing and the disparate
impacts of policing on populations in the U.S. may be connected and further how tiered justice
outcomes may be a design element of America’s policing structure. As such, most of the
research to date has not examined how revenue-focused criminal justice processes intentionally
or unintentionally impact citizens. When research has examined these aspects there has been
disagreement about where the motivation to engage in revenue-based policing activity originates.
While several studies point to uncontrollable economic downturn to explain shifts in criminal
justice institutions, many factors were left out when researchers came to these conclusions. This
leaves relevant elements inadequately explored and limits the external validity of findings. While
these studies have been able to capture evidence of rises in reported use of policing for profit,
theoretical assumptions in these works led to methodological issues that limit findings and need
to be examined using alternative methodology.
Keywords: financial distress, social control, revenue generation, neoliberalism
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Chapter 1: Introduction
There are a variety of studies that examined the role of economic structures in policing.
These inquiries offer insight into revenue-based law enforcement activities but are
simultaneously limited by blind spots in theorization (Collins, 2007; Garrett & Wagner, 2009;
Goldstein, Sances, You, 2020; Harv. L. Rev., 2015; Henricks & Harvey 2017; Henricks 2019;
Holcomb, Williams, Hicks, Kovandzic, Meitl, 2018; Jaeger, 2016; Jones, 2018; Lemos &
Minzner, 2013; Mello, 2019; Phillips & Gayadeen, 2015; Sances and You, 2017; Singla,
Kirschner, Stone, 2019; Stuart, 2016; Su, 2019; Teague, 2016; Wamsley, 2019; Worrall, 2001;
Worrall & Kovandzic, 2008). Reviewing these studies, it is apparent the criminal justice system
can and is used to gain revenue for a multitude of public and private organizations (Du Bois,
1903; Fuqua & Sloan, 2005; Wacquant, 2008; Alexander, 2012; Stevenson, 2017). Further it is
clear this is not a new phenomenon in the United States. Nor is the disparate impact of criminal
justice activity on segments of U.S. society such as; poor or homeless citizens, minority
populations such as blacks and latinx populations, and LGBTQ+ communities (Fuqua & Sloan,
2005; Teague, 2011; Durán, 2013; Eisen, 2014; Linnemann, Wall, Green, 2014; Anderson,
2015; Buist and Lenning, 2015; Leovy, 2015; Davis, 2017; Herbert & Beckett, 2017; Lopez,
2019; Vitale, 2017).
Contemporary criminological studies have set out to explore the different initiatives that
gain capital using criminal justice mechanisms. Such activities include asset forfeiture, as well as
issuing fines and fees, the latter practice being carried out by private probation companies,
police, and courts. While these studies have been able to capture evidence of rises in reported
use, theoretical assumptions about the role of economic structures in policing in these works led
to methodological issues that limit findings and need to be examined. Various aspects of the
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practice were overlooked and need to be further researched (Worrall, 2001; Harv. L. Rev, 2015;
Phillips and Gayadeen, 2015; Stuart, 2016; Teague, 2016; Holcomb, Williams, Hicks, Henricks
and Harvey, 2017; Stances & You, 2017; Kovandzic & Meitl, 2018; Hendricks, 2019)
As mentioned previously, studies have illustrated that the American criminal justice
system has been used to generate economic capital, though there has been disagreement about
were the motivation to engage in such an activity originates. Additionally, the ends of this
activity remain unclear. Taken together, these studies give evidence that this criminal justice
capital generation was not exclusive to any one area of the criminal justice system, but instead
included a variety of public and private actors. Moreover, revenue generating policies and
practices were demonstrated to have been carried out in police departments, court rooms,
prisons, and jails across the country (Giblin & Nowacki, 2018; Harv. L Rev., 2015; Henricks &
Harvey, 2017; Henricks, 2019; Holcomb et al., 2018; Phillips & Gayadeen, 2015; Sances and
You, 2016; Stuart, 2016; Teague, 2016; Worrall, 2001). Phillips and Gayadeen (2015) found that
the trend of using the criminal justice system for revenue generation, or “policing for profit”
(PFP), was exacerbated by the U.S.’s experience with a severe economic downturn that occurred
in 2007. Equally important, this 2007 decline was said to be the worst the U.S. had experienced
since the Great Depression of the 1930s. A variety of indicators, including increased
unemployment, housing foreclosures, local austerity budgets, and cuts in social spending, point
to the national scope of the problem. However, it remains unclear if these factors drove the move
to a heavier reliance on policing for profit or if economic turbulence simply allowed such shifts
to take place (Harvey, 2005). The review that follows sets out to examine the differing academic
viewpoints that attempt to explain the role of police officers and police departments in PFP.
Giblin, & Nowacki, (2018) explored financial distress in municipal police agencies. The study
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mentioned the 2007 recession and noted that the impact of the economic downturn on state
institutions had not been adequately explored. In that piece, the focus was to understand how
“fiscal distress” related to economic shocks, declining demand for services, and organizational
complexity. The study used LEMAS data and noted the 2013 LEMAS administration was the
first to collect data about organizational responses to financial crisis.
Financial distress was operationalized using 4 dependent variables. Variables included
reductions in staff salaries, furloughs, hiring freezes, and layoffs. Both 2007 and 2013 LEMAS
survey data was collected for 509 state, county, and local departments that employed 100 or
more full time officers. The study looked at environmental indicators with data drawn from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Environmental indicators included declining demand for
police services, dropping political support for police, and increasing departmental size and
complexity. Data on environmental indicators and financial distress was also collected from the
Census Bureau’s 2007 American Community Survey, the 2007 and 2011 Uniform Crime
Reports (UCR), and the 2010 Municipal Yearbook put out by the International City/County
Management Association (Giblin, & Nowacki, 2018).
Of the four independent variables, the study found that financial distress was primarily
associated with three of these: local economic context, changes in crime rate, and organization
size. The first of these variables, “local economic context,” was found to have an insulating
effect on departments. For instance, areas with strong economies were found to have experienced
less fiscal distress. Second, changes in crime rate were inversely associated with levels of
distress, as areas with an increasing crime rate had more need for officers resulting in less
cutbacks and thus lower distress. In contrast, areas with a lower demand for services were more
likely to experience issues. The last variable, the size of the organization, was directly associated
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with level of distress. For larger organizations with more officers, distress was found to be more
likely. However, it was noted a larger organization may be more equipped to survive cutbacks
whereas a smaller department facing similar cutbacks might shut down (Giblin, & Nowacki,
2018).
In order to move research past its present understanding, a more robust framework will
be needed than the previous studies employed. (Giblin & Nowacki, 2018; Harv. L Rev., 2015;
Henricks & Harvey, 2017; Henricks, 2019; Holcomb et al., 2018; Phillips & Gayadeen, 2015;
Sances and You, 2016; Stuart, 2016; Teague, 2016; Worrall, 200). The following section will
introduce neoliberalism and explain how it can be used to better understand PFP.
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Chapter 2: Neoliberalism
The term neoliberalism is most often understood as either an “ideology of governance”
used to form subjectivities or as a “structural force” that impacts people’s life chances. As an
analytical framework, neoliberalism has the potential to bring a variety of concepts into the same
frame. In contrast, the term has the potential to obscure research due to under theorization and its
often unjustifiably broad use. The question is frequently raised, “why use the term neoliberalism,
why not just use the term late capitalism or liberalism?” The answer is that neoliberalism is
conceptually distinct from these other terms and offers a unique framework for theorizing PFP
(Ganti 2014; Rose, O'Malley, Valverde, 2006; Wacquant, 2012).

Social Science of Neoliberalism
Invisible forces. Neoliberalism is hinged on the idea of influence from a distance. In
order to maintain control without being present, authorities needed to figure out ways to produce
compliance from humans and non-humans. This element in the theorization of remote control led
to the criticism of theories of governance. The concept of influencing subjects from a distance
was also criticized. The issue taken up was that theorizations posited people were being
influenced by invisible forces (Law, 1984).
Law (1984) shed light on these “invisible forces” by researching how the Portuguese
gained control of spice trading in the 16th century. The efforts went beyond naval travel and
navigation law and focused on the large vessels (the Carrack) that were used for spice trading.
Law argued that by looking at how these vessels were regulated the properties of long-distance
influence could be observed and that these elements would be crucial to any system of longdistance control. Furthermore, Law pointed out that it was pivotal for the examination to view
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the economic, political, social, and natural as interconnected in order to understand this
operation. Law (1984) stated:
Of course kings and merchants appear in the story. But so too do sailors and
astronomers, navigators and soldiers of fortune, astrolabes and astronomical
tables, vessels and ports of call, and last but not least, the winds and currents that
lay between Lisbon and Calicut. (p. 235)
The issue for the Portuguese was the management of long-distance control. For the people in
power, there was a need to develop a system wherein matters taking place on the other side of
the globe (the periphery of the empire) could be influenced by a small number of individuals in
Lisbon (the center of the empire). In this way, control of the spice trade required vessels that
could maintain mobility, durability, the ability to exert force, and the ability to return. Law
argued that this system included, but went beyond, a need for social control of sailors. In this
case, it was necessary to extract compliance from both human and non-human elements. Law
argued, while artefacts did form an important part of systems of long-distance control, they did
not stand apart from human subjects, because they too could be directed by social interests.
Devices were developed and employed that could maintain mobility, durability and
fidelity during long voyages. These devices included non-human elements, such as the vessel
(The Carrack), cannons, navigation instruments, sails, and cargo space. All of these elements
were imprinted with knowledge, through improvement, thus allowing for increased fidelity,
durability, and mobility. In this way, objects were directed by social interests, as they contained
the concentrated intention of many years of expertise, calculation, correspondence, argument,
and innovation. This principle can be seen when looking at the solar declination table, which is a
navigation table that could serve as a stand-in for the expertise of an actual astronomer. Any

REVENUE POLICING, SOCIAL CONTROL, AND NEOLIBERALISM

7

vessel accompanied by such a chart could borrow said expertise on voyages and exert the
astrological power it held (Law, 1984).

Governmentality: Examining Formation of Subjectivities
To understand the genealogy of neoliberalism and its potential for shaping subjectivities,
it will be necessary to understand the governmentality approach. Foucault introduced the term
governmentality in 1970 while conducting research on political power. Governmentality, he
proposed, was a way of analyzing developments in the art of governing. By analyzing the
techniques and procedures used for directing human behavior, Foucault was able to trace the
development of different arts of governing through history (Rose et al., 2006). Put another way,
Simon (2001) explained that Foucault’s concept of “Governmentality” is a combination of the
words Governmental and Rationalities. The governmentality approach then looks at how the task
of acting on other’s actions or governing is inextricably linked to ways of reasoning about that
same task
One example where the governmentality approach is employed is the theory of governing
using crime metaphors. Simon (2001) explains that governing through crime metaphors entails
people with power using “crime” metaphorically as a model problem for rationalizing the scope
and responsibility of government to their agents, subjects and to themselves. “Governing through
crime “is a theory that draws from the cognitive sciences. it argues, the construct (metaphor) of
crime is taken from the domain of public wrongs and is transferred to other domains making
certain conclusions seem visible in ways they otherwise would not be. One example of this is
using crime as a metaphor for explaining the dangers of free speech. This is done by
conceptualizing free speech through an example crime, specifically if someone misleadingly
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screamed fire in a crowded theater there could be such a commotion someone could be harmed
or killed. Using said metaphor the danger of free speech is associated with the crime of causing
injury or death of an individual in a crowded theater. Using crime as a metaphor free speech
seems like a reasonable location for state intervention due to the potential danger. In this way
metaphors can be understood as a tool that stands in for legal reasoning for non-legally trained
individuals by providing a way for people to know and act on any number of actions. Simon
argues that in American institutions crime has become the model problem that is used to
understand the role of government since about 1968.
Reason of state vs. liberalism. Going back to the development of the governmentality
approach we see an early application of this analysis led to Foucault’s theorization of the
emergence of “reason of state.” This was an art of government that came about in the early 18th
century and replaced earlier techniques of government which were tied to the promotion of
borrowed values, such as virtue, wisdom, prudence, etc. Instead, reason of state gave priority to
anyone that could bolster the state and its power. Additionally, the reason of state approach to
governing sought to intervene in the lives of the population in order to manage actions of citizens
to serve the state. In the late 18th century, there was also an idea emerging that humans formed a
collectivity of living beings with characteristics unlike those that shape individual wills. This
idea required techniques that understood populations based on specific knowledge or “expertise”
and governed these populations using techniques attune to emergent understandings (Rose et al.,
2006).
Foucault argued that liberalism came about in the 19th century as a new art of government
that addressed issues with reason of state. While reason of state believed that human behavior
should be governed for the benefit of the state, this led to the repeated complaint of over
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governing. Liberalism was therefore distinct from reason of state because it stressed not only
state intervention for the state’s benefit, but also promoted state intervention for society’s benefit
(Rose et al., 2006).
Liberalism vs. neoliberalism. Though neoliberalism and classic liberalism both promote
the use of market-based solutions over state-based solutions, there are important differences
between these two terms. Classical liberalism proposes that the state should simply leave markets
alone, and in theory, this would allow for a variety of market-based solutions to be carried out,
therefore resulting in a “desirable” society. In contrast, neoliberalism operates under the
assumption that such a society will not emerge naturally, but instead requires concentrated
political effort and organization. In this way, a neoliberal state would look to utilize the market
and proactively seek out ways to empower or expand the market, while the liberal state would be
hands off and inactive. Furthermore, neoliberalism looks to redefine what the state is and how it
can operate to serve market interests, not to eliminate the state (Ganti, 2014).
Neoliberalism vs. late capitalism. Late capitalism is a politically neutral term that is
used to describe and characterize transformations in the nature of capitalism. Neoliberalism on
the other hand, is a philosophy developed around a political agenda aimed at keeping the power
of economic decision, making away from those actors and organizations that would make
decisions based on the interests of the working class. Also, neoliberalism can be traced to a
historical point. It was developed by a specific network of intellectuals and institutions in the
United States and Europe in the wake of World War One. Furthermore, it was aimed at opposing
the increasing power of collectivism, state-centered planning, and socialism (Ganti, 2014).
Though the origins of the formation of neoliberalism as an idea can be traced back to the early
20th century, its development as a political philosophy is often traced to 1947, when American
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and European economists met at a conference in Mont Pellerin, Switzerland. The conference was
co-sponsored by the William Volker Fund based in Kansas City, Missouri; Credit Swiss; and the
Foundation for Economic Education based in New York state. The goal of the conference was to
address concerns of intellectual isolation and an inability to influence policy makers. The
meeting culminated in the formation of the Mont Pellerin Society, or MSP, that then set out to
build a global network of trustworthy intellectuals who could be entrusted to promote the utility
of neoliberalism (Ganti, 2014).
Common elements of modern governance. From reason of state to neoliberalism, it
appeared that what was common through all these ideologies was a certain mentality, termed
governmentality by Foucault, which had become a shared element of all modern forms of
political thought and action. Additionally, each art of government entailed certain understandings
of the nature and obligations of its subjects (Rose et al., 2006).
Using the governmentality approach to examine these different formations, it was clear
that any art of governing was obliged to explicitly or implicitly answer certain questions about
governance, including subject of governance (who or what?), justifications for governance, and
the methods of governance. Rose et al. further explains subjectivity stating: “Thus, the governed
are, variously, members of a flock to be nurtured or culled, juridical subjects whose conduct is to
be limited by law, individuals to be disciplined, or, indeed, people to be freed” (p. 85). Repeated
use of this approach revealed that everything from economics to the moral order had been made
quantifiable and practicable by various governing actors, turning them into seemingly
predictable, natural, and manageable domains. Governmentality is not so much a theory of
power, authority, or governance as it is a method of analysis that asks questions amenable to
precise answers using empirical inquiry (Rose et al., 2006).
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In the cases of reason of state, liberalism, and neoliberalism, no single body was
responsible for governing the conduct of subjects in the way the state was previously understood
to. Instead, these perspectives recognized that various authorities governed in different sites
working towards different objectives. This meant there was the questions of who is governing
what, what logic is being used, what techniques are being employed, and what ends do these
efforts seek to achieve? (Rose et al., 2006).
While governmentality was not developed to investigate a specific problem, it did come
about to make sense of political changes taking place in the U.S., U.K., and other nations around
the globe. For instance, welfare was being continually critiqued along with other mechanisms of
social security. Additionally, there were ongoing critiques of state-owned enterprises and state
planning. While there was criticism from the left, many of these critics were perplexed by the
adaptation of what was often termed neoliberalism. Here, neoliberalism was an art of
government that operated in the name of freedom. Under the guise of freedom, the state divested
from many of its responsibilities. Instead, these functions would be carried out by quasiautonomous entities that would be governed at a distance using “budgets, audits, standards,
benchmarks, and other technologies that were both autonomizing and reponsibilizing” (Rose et
al., 2006, p. 91)

Neoliberal Ideology: Self-Regulating Subjects
As a political-economic philosophy, the core concerns of neoliberalism are private
property as a key element of decentralizing power and preventing concentrations of power that
could jeopardize individual freedom. Moreover, freedom of choice is promoted across all
domains of production and consumption for consumers, producers, and workers. It was believed
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this freedom was imperative for efficient and satisfactory production of goods and services. As
well, freedom of choice is further extended to “individuals” who needed the right to plan their
own lives as opposed to being directed by state authority. It was claimed achieving this required
an appropriate legal and institutional framework that allowed government activity to be rendered
predictable, a framework based on fixed rules that encouraged an effective competitive order
(Ganti, 2014).
This competitive social order is theorized to be based on market dominance that spreads
through a society leading to the formation of a certain type of subject. As market logic spreads
throughout society so does: a hegemonic understanding of freedom, personal responsibility,
individualism, and personal property rights. This logic leads individuals at all levels of society to
evaluate their lives using neoliberal logic and to view their lives like an enterprise, striving to
constantly improve their market value. As a result of competition, there is inequality, but
generally this is accepted by society. In this neoliberal perspective, things like poverty or
unemployment are viewed as the result of poor choices by subjects (Ganti, 2014; Harvey, 2005).

Neoliberal Structural Forces: Policy and Material Effects
Neoliberalism is also theorized as a structural force. These studies have documented the
effects and outcomes of neoliberal policies and economic restructuring linking policy to shifts
such as the privatization of public resources, gentrification, and welfare retrenchment. Looking
at the ways that neoliberalism impacts people’s life chances in different places, it becomes clear
that there is a disconnect between what neoliberalism ideology claims society will look like and
what it actually looks like when put into policy. Overall, anthropological inquiry has found
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people are worse off than they were before restructuring across the globe (Ericson, Barry, Doyle,
2000; Ganti 2014; Morgen & Gonzales, 2008).
Welfare policy. In the case of welfare restructuring in the United States, we see that Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) was eliminated in 1996. To replace this program,
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) was put in place. TANF was fundamentally
different from AFDC because it required a beneficiary be employed. This was an important
policy feature, since one criticism of the “welfare state” was that it encouraged unemployment.
In the following years, the caseload of recipients fell by over 50% and the policy was celebrated
as successful public policy. Though the 1996 welfare reform was hailed as a success because of
the drop in welfare caseloads, by looking at the impact on recipients, it is clear approval of these
reforms was not universal. Specifically, interviews with beneficiaries showed gaps in acceptance.
Work-first policies (workfare) were reported to force individuals to take low-wage and dead-end
jobs. The article argues these counter narratives of welfare recipients show gaps in acceptance of
neoliberal thought. Interviews also revealed support of dominant narratives about deservedness,
productive citizenship, being a good worker, and consumption (Morgen & Gonzales, 2008).
Insurance policy. Insurance reform has occurred in Britain, the U.S., and Canada. In
these countries, we see more examples of how neoliberal restructuring can produce structural
forces that impact an individual’s life chances, govern and punish behavior, and reproduce
inequality. Restructuring of insurance has lifted regulations, thus allowing banks to compete in
the insurance marketplace. This has resulted in competitive pressure. One result of these
pressures has been the segmentation of insurance policies as firms seek to insure only the most
desirable accounts (Ericson et al., 2000).
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Risk segmentation has become increasingly common for agencies. For individuals with
less risky policies, they receive lower rates, as do the others in their insurance tier. In contrast,
"undesirable" accounts are put together and these accounts have high premiums and graduating
penalty systems. Furthermore, because these accounts are undesirable, it has created a niche
market for small local firms. The niche market, for example, being individuals who have a bad
driving record but are required to have car insurance. Because large firms seek out and capture
the best insurance risks, local companies are forced to operate in a niche market. The local
companies can be exceptionally profitable due to the conditions they operate under. First, there is
not competition for these “poor risk” accounts. Second, minimal insurance coverage is provided
by policies. Additionally, these agencies collect interest from payment financing, which is used
more often in these “poor risk” cases. Finally, these policies are expensive. Another shift in the
structure of private insurance is the increased policing of insurance holders. This entailed a
dramatic increase in fraud investigation units, as well as extension of policing into the activities
of other actors. One example of this is training doctors to diagnose "malingering" (faking illness)
to stop attempts at making false insurance claims (Ericson et al., 2000).

Theories of Neoliberalism
David Harvey on neoliberalism. According to Harvey (2005), the theory of
neoliberalism can be understood as a set of political economic practices in which human
wellbeing and “freedom” is advanced primarily by liberating the entrepreneurial freedoms and
skills of individuals. These skills and freedoms are then meant to be applied in an institutional
framework that favors strong individual private property rights, the free functioning of markets,
free trade, and the rule of law. Individual freedom is protected, and each individual is required to
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take responsibility for their own actions and personal well-being. For this reason, failure in these
areas are seen as personal rather than systemic. Thus, the freedom of individuals to act, choose,
and express themselves is considered vital. Similarly, it is held that the freedom of businesses
and corporations to operate in the same institutional framework freely (as individuals) is
fundamentally good. It is then expected that these individuals will compete and continually
increase productivity creating a higher living standard for all individuals.
In this theoretical arrangement, the state’s role is to create and preserve an institutional
framework that accommodates neoliberal principles (free trade, free markets, individual property
rights, etc.). This may require the state to create markets that do not already exist. Markets are
opened under the belief that unclear private property rights are an institutional barrier to
development and the improvement of human welfare. Based on this belief, sectors formerly
under state control can be moved to the private sector and deregulated, thus allowing competition
to take place. The state may impose rules and property rights that allow a new market to operate
in cases were no systems exist. Once a market is created, the state is supposed to minimize its
interference, since it is believed the state lacks proper information to understand markets and
would likely be influenced by powerful groups that will use interventions in markets for personal
gains. Protection of contracts and individual freedoms is carried out by the state, which is seen as
having monopoly power over legitimate violence. State coercive power is also expected to be
mobilized to preserve the neoliberal framework. According to Harvey (2005):
[The State] must also set up those military, defense, police and legal structures
and functions required to ensure private property rights and to guarantee, by force
if need be, the proper functioning of markets. (p. 2)
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If movements opposed to neoliberalization organize within a state, these individuals can be
disciplined using globalization and international competition to dissuade, for example, a labor
strike. Moreover, according to Harvey (2005), in situations where these state measures are
insufficient in suppressing movements, the state is required to use persuasion and/or propaganda.
Likewise, if these are ineffective the state must use “raw force and police power to suppress
opposition to neoliberalism” (p. 70). Although Harvey (2005) explains that the state is compelled
to set up structures that can be used to protect private property rights and ensure market
functioning, including police and legal structures, there is no discussion of what these structures
consist of.
Loic Wacquant on neoliberalism. Wacquant (2012) discusses how there are two
primary camps for analyzing neoliberalism. On the one hand is a narrowly defined hegemonic
economic model of market rule. On the other hand, is the use of broad Foucauldian inspired
notions of governmentality to conceptualize neoliberalism. In contrast, the author posits that
neoliberalism can be better understood as a political project that has always been open ended,
plural, and adaptive, but still identifiable by its institutional core. At its core is a formulation of
state, market and citizenship that harnesses the state to impose the stamp of the market onto
citizenship.
Wacquant (2012) called for three shifts to reconceptualize neoliberalism in order to make
a historical anthropology possible. First, in this framework, neoliberalism is not characterized by
an invasion of market doctrine or techniques, but rather as a concrete political constellation with
the aim of effectively redefining citizenship through market conforming policies. Second, this
concept sees neoliberalism as a “thick” sociological conception where the state selects the
“institutional machinery” required for establishing market dominance and the impact such
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dominance will have on social membership. Finally, Wacquant recommended using the concept
of “bureaucratic field,” wherein a set of organizations are able to monopolize the definition and
distribution of public good. Furthermore, by using this concept, the state can be understood as a
space of forces and struggles over control of ideas including the definition of public authority
and the power to define and address social problems.
Simon (2002) offers an example of a shift in control over the bureaucratic field. The 1968
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act was the first achievement after control of the
Bureaucratic field was captured by a group made up of republicans that had opposed new deal
expansion and southern democrats that fought to preserve racial segregation. This conservative
union had seen the passage of the 1964 civil rights act as a major loss, spurring mobilization.
This understanding was not lost on the then present Lyndon B. Johnson who predicted the
signing of the legislation would result in southern democrats leaving the party. It is further
argued that since this occurrence the same group has dominated American politics. The 1968 bill
was only the first of the many fruits of this new political amalgamation that expanded the breadth
and depth of American criminal justice.
Wacquant (2012) puts forth three hypotheses and supports them using historical
evidence. The first is that neoliberalism is a political project, which is made apparent by markets
themselves being a political creation, not a natural occurrence. Moreover, markets are set up and
refereed by extensive political authority that is held up by expansive legal and administrative
machinery, which, in the modern state, takes the form of state institutions. In kind, the state is
required to interfere with markets to overcome opposition and limit “strategies of evasion.”
Finally, it is mentioned that since its inception in the 1930s, neoliberalism has always had the
dual goal of opposing collectivist solution to economic problems and to take a more involved
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role than the watchmen state of classic liberalism. This project is accomplished using four
institutional logics: commodification to extend and diffuse markets and market mechanisms, a
disciplinary policy shift from right to welfare to a conditional workfare, extensive and
pornographic penal policies, and the trope of individual responsibility.
Second, Wacquant (2012) posits that neoliberalism requires a rightward tilt in the
bureaucratic field from the protective and social left hand of the state to the disciplinary and
economic right hand. Furthermore, in this transition, the state is not hollowed out and redrawn,
but is instead reconstructed and redeployed. This shift entails the transfer of populations,
programs, and resources from the left hand to the right, as well as the spread of economic
techniques and tropes from the right hand to the left. Furthermore, the left hand is noted to
include the criminal justice arm of the state, police, courts, and corrections. In this instance, the
state is seen as a space of forces and struggles over ideas of public authority and defining social
problems and addressing them.
The third hypothesis is that the neoliberal project necessitates the expansion and
glorification of the penal wing of the state despite claims of an end to “big government.” This is
evidenced by the rehabilitation and expansion of the penal apparatus following expansion of
market dominance in most of the post-industrial West, Latin America, and the Soviet Bloc with
few internal exceptions. Furthermore, those imprisoned in these regions are disproportionately
made up of the urban poor, ethnic and national outsiders, the homeless, and people with mental
illnesses. Expansion of the penal wing also entails the aggressive deployment, increased budgets,
personnel, and precedence of police. Courts are given more resources to address unruly behavior
and minor offences. In addition, crime is glorified to the point crime images are commodified. In
sum, the penal expansion serves two ends. First, the expansion curbs mounting dislocation that
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stems from the normalization of social insecurity at the bottom of society. Second, it aids in the
restoration of authority of the governing elite by reaffirming law and order (Wacquant, 2012).
Wacquant (2012) urges the recognition of the police, the court, and the prison as “core
political capacities” through which neoliberalism governs physical space, divides social space,
exaggerates symbolic divisions, and stages sovereignty. Because of the central role these
institutions play, they must be brought to the center of research. Wacquant (2012) explains there
is a need for:
a renewed political anthropology of rule capable of capturing how the state marks
out and manages problem territories and categories in its quest to make markets
and to mold citizens who conform to them, whether they like them or not. (p. 76)

Collier on Wacquant. It is important to note that the term neoliberalism is highly
disputed, and Wacquant’s theory has its critics. Collier (2012) found that when Wacquant
attempted to pin down the term neoliberalism, he made a problematic methodological
choice in his argument. This is exemplified in the way he drew a correlation between
liberalization and the expansion in penality. The issue was Wacquant’s theorization did
not account for cases in which economic liberalization was not paired with social welfare
retrenchment or with a rapidly expanding penal apparatus. Collier (2012) points out that
the problem is Wacquant did not make his argument by pointing out cases where
neoliberal policies or programs were fused with other things in a way that highlighted the
empirical and explanatory limits of neoliberalism. Instead, according to Collier,
Wacquant simply found neoliberal ideas, associated them with unsavory regimes or
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Chapter 3: Logical Link
Neoliberal Policing
Findings in the area of policing for profit (PFP) suggest the phenomenon could be better
understood by evaluating the applicability of PFP as part of the larger neoliberal project
(Worrall, 2001; Harvard Law Review, 2015; Phillips & Gayadeen, 2015; Stuart, 2016; Teague,
2016; Holcombet al., 2017; Stances & You, 2017; Kovandzic & Meitl, 2018; Hendricks, 2019).
In this section, it will be argued that while these works come to varied conclusions about the role
of capital in policing, taken together, empirical data in the PFP literature illustrate the features
and logics of a neoliberal state, such as a polarized social order or “centaur state,”
commodification, and promotion of the trope of individual responsibility (Wacquant 2012).
Repeated discovery suggests an overarching neoliberal logic exists that informs PFP (Harvard
Law Review, 2015; Teague 2016). Of equal importance, findings point out that revenue-based
policing strategies are practiced throughout the country. Thus, the following section will discuss
evidence that suggests these themes in policing for profit are part of larger efforts to develop a
neoliberal state conducive to neoliberal policing rather than a failure of policy.

The Centaur State
PFP studies are decorated with examples of social issues being exacerbated by PFP
policies. Looking over the data, PFP has frequently been associated with a polarized social and
economic structure (Harvard Law Review, 2015; Hendricks 2019; Stances & You, 2017; Stuart
2016; Teague, 2016). In the realm of law enforcement, Harvard Law Review (2015) found issues
with trust and legitimacy between police and citizens were aggravated by the practice of serving
warrants based on debt. Stuart (2016) also collected reports of revenue policing leading to
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distrust, fear, and intentional avoidance of police in particular areas of high enforcement. This
occurred in instances when draconian levels of enforcement were achieved by focusing use of
police power on enforcement activities that had a low threshold for intervention, specifically by
issuing fines and fees (Stuart, 2016).
Evidence from the PFP literature illustrated the tiered impact of a court focused on
reducing budgets and/or generating revenue (Harvard Law Review, 2015; Teague, 2016). In the
area of probation, Teague (2016) discovered examples of privatization and found tension in the
relation between supervisees and the private probation officers running the court’s probation
department. This was problematic as probation was meant to be a partnership that kept
individuals out of jail and prison, an arrangement intended to be beneficial to both parties was
turned adversarial. Specifically, there was evidence that individuals put on probation were
ending up in jail as a result of probation fines and fees. This privatization agreement gave private
probation officers the ability to compel law enforcement officers to enforce debt. Furthermore,
warrants could be based solely on the supervisee’s inability to pay fines or fees (Harvard Law
Review, 2015; Teague 2016).
As Harvard Law Review (2015) found, the Ferguson, Missouri, government
disproportionately targeted the majority black population, while White citizens had
disproportionately low contact with police. Hendricks (2019) found mandatory financial
punishment policy had the effect of allowing law enforcement that reproduced racial inequality.
In Cook county, Illinois, for instance we saw certain low-level crimes carried mandatory
financial punishments while other more harmful crimes did not. Crimes were then policed in a
disproportionate way that brought poorer minority citizens into the system more frequently.
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For citizens, PFP reproduced economic, racial, and social inequality. PFP activities, such
as offender funded probation, fines, fees, and mandatory financial punishments, presented a
much greater threat to those at the bottom of the economic ladder and left impoverished
individuals incarcerated or under state/private supervision with debt, and limited recourse.
(Harvard Law Review, 2015; Henricks, 2019; Stuart 2016; Teague, 2016). This was also true for
court fines/fees and mandatory financial sanctions (Harvard Law Review, 2015; Hendricks 2019;
Henricks and Harvey, 2017; Stances & You, 2017; Stuart 2016; Teague, 2016). In contrast,
Teague (2016) found that net widening could be avoided by the more affluent members of
society. Specifically, PFP based economic burdens could be addressed quickly by paying fines
and fees in their entirety (Teague, 2016). Thus, these individuals would be able to avoid cycles
of debt, incarceration, and supervision. Additionally, those with higher economic capital could
theoretically employ private legal protection This allowed for them an additional barrier against
state action and made individuals less suitable targets for revenue policing in the first place.
For the state agencies that engaged in PFP, there was a variety of benefits and few risks.
Beyond funding criminal justice costs, PFP allowed police to ensure funding and use
discretionary power to decide who will carry the cost of policing while lowering the chances of
being flagged for racially bias policing (Harvard Law Review, 2015; Henricks, 2019). When
looking at implementation, Hendricks and Harvey (2017) found economic issues were not the
most significant indicators of higher monetary punishment, instead, of greater significance was
the percentage of a municipality’s population that was Black. Following this, Harvey (2019)
found that mandatory financial punishments produced racially unequal outcomes and were tied
more frequently to low level crimes that were being policed more aggressively across the U.S.
Thus, in these cases, we see the “centaur” state formation theorized by Wacquant (2012) that is

REVENUE POLICING, SOCIAL CONTROL, AND NEOLIBERALISM

24

more liberating to those at the top, while simultaneously producing more limitations for those at
the socioeconomic bottom.

Commodification
There were recurring instances of criminal justice wards being treated as simple
commodities that served the purpose of producing revenue. The privatization of American
probation departments was evidenced to allow provision of probation service that was devoid of
traditional rehabilitative programing. Instead, supervision entailed meetings with officers
focused on the collection of fines and fees for supervision. Augmenting the issue of
commodification was data that illustrated how, through the privatization of probation,
individuals that would traditionally be managed by the state as a “public good” were being
handed over to the private sector. In the private sector, traditional protections from excessive
fines and fees were not applicable as fines and fees were not being issued by the state. Having a
private company running the probation department meant that records were not inherently public
as would be the case with state run probation. Thus, private probation had a much greater
potential to generate revenue due to lack of regulation or oversight. Of equal importance were
findings that illustrated a net widening effect as individuals that traditionally would not be put on
probation were being put under supervision due to an inability to pay a fine as in “pay-onlyprobation” cases (Harvard Law Review, 2015: Teague, 2016). Even in instances when the
populations were still in state hands, there was evidence that civilians involved with the state
criminal justice system were being used as a commodity that could be manipulated for capital.
Furthermore, capital extracted from citizens was being used not only for court cost but for
general government expansion (Harvard Law Review, 2015; Sances & You, 2017).
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Trope of Individual Responsibility
An increased emphasis on individual responsibility was associated with the adaptation of
PFP strategies in at least three ways observed in the literature (Harvard Law Review, 2015;
Sances & You 2017; Stuart, 2016; Teague, 2016). First, the responsibility associated with
adjusting daily conduct to avoid being stopped in relation to newly criminalized street level
activities (Stuart, 2016). Second, responsibilities were associated with the de-facto
criminalization of debt (Teague, 2016). Finally, responsibility was associated with the imposition
of court user fees, and this was especially true of those fees that covered non-court expenditures
(Sances & You, 2017).
Stuart (2016) found that zero tolerance policing took the form of an infusion of officers in
an area focused on writing tickets for any low-level infraction detected. The research was
focused on how the newly criminalized activities impacted the community. Evidence was found
that the widened scope of policing allowed for police contact in a greater variety of situations.
Findings highlighted how street level criminalization produced economic burdens and legal
responsibilities as individuals attempted to carry out daily activities. Thus, daily activity was
infused with decisions and conduct focused on avoiding police contact.
In the second instance, data showed cases where warrants had been issued for the arrest
of individuals that carried public or private probation/court debt (Harvard Law Review, 2015;
Teague 2016). In Georgia, for example, warrants could be issued for individuals on the grounds
that they had violated probation. A violation that was the result of an inability to pay private
supervision fees (Teague, 2016). As such, the emphasis was put on the requirement to “choose”
to pay these supervision fees or go to jail. In Ferguson and other cities utilizing private probation,
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there was an increased level of responsibility put on individuals as probation carried the threat of
jail time for additional violations (Harvard Law Review, 2015; Teague 2016)
In the third instance, findings pointed out that once an individual was engaged with the
criminal justice system additional emphasis was being put on the idea that they (not the state or
the public) needed to pay for use of the criminal justice system. Additionally, those that went
through the court were issued fees that went to fund the cost of services used by the general
public that would traditionally be covered by tax revenue. In this example, we see a shift from
viewing the criminal justice system as a public good that all citizens pay into and instead was
being viewed as a service that should not be provided for free. As such, “usage” fees and other
court based economic sanctions imposed personal responsibility onto those that used the criminal
justice system resulting from arrest, prosecution, public defenders, jurors, and incarceration, but
also pension funds and general government expenses (Harvard Law Review, 2015; Teague
2016).
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Chapter 4: What Can Neoliberal Insight Bring to Studies of Policing and Profit?
Neoliberal Insights
This section will start by arguing that Wacquant’s call for corrections, court, and
especially policing research, can be answered by asking if PFP is part of the neoliberal state
crafting project Wacquant theorized (Wacquant, 2012). This section will continue by illustrating
how examples of Wacquant’s concepts like penal expansion, struggles over state authority, and
the transfer of populations and resources in the PFP literature justify an examination of PFP as a
part of Wacquant’s neoliberal state crafting project. The section will go on to suggest that such
an examination will require the use of a more robust theoretical framework than previous PFP
studies incorporated. Next, a theoretical framework will be developed based on Wacquant’s 3
steps to reconceptualization of neoliberalism as they relate to PFP. The section will culminate
with the introduction of a fourth camp. This camp will be based on Wacquant’s theory of the
neoliberal project. Moving forward, this fourth camp will be used to critique previous studies
that set out to explain various elements of PFP.

Addressing the Call for Law Enforcement Research
Both Harvey (2005) and Wacquant (2012) called for extension of criminal justice
research. While Harvey (2005) explained that the use of coercion is necessary to ensure
neoliberal interests like functioning of markets and disciplining of the labor force, it is not laid
out in a concrete way how the state, as opposed to say a police department, a municipal court, a
private probation company, or even an individual officer, could be seen as instrumental in
producing outcomes that should be considered neoliberal. Similarly, Wacquant (2012) called for
a move to place police, courts, and prisons into the center of research on the anthropology of
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state rule. Despite the call, the task remains difficult as Wacquant (2012) did not theorize a way
to expand inquiry into federal, state, and local use of law enforcement in such a way that would
illustrate a neoliberal influence. As such, there is a need for further theorization on what is or is
not neoliberal about policing for profit.
What Can We See?-Three Hypotheses
Wacquant took the position that neoliberalism operated through structural forces and
specified that these forces resonated from state action, not markets. Wacquant (2012) had three
hypotheses about neoliberalism all addressed in the PFP literature, the first being that
neoliberalism is a political project not an economic regime. The second was that
neoliberalisation entails a tilt in the bureaucratic field from the protective hand of the state to the
disciplinary hand of the state. The third, neoliberalism requires expansion and glorification of the
penal wing of the state. When we look at the PFP literature, we can see elements of each
sprinkled through the various PFP studies included in the literature review.
First hypothesis. The PFP literature findings suggest that neoliberalism is a political
project, as opposed to an economic regime. As Wacquant (2012) points out, markets require
management by political authority. Looking at private probation, we can see that the articles
discussed specific political changes that allowed private probation to come into operation. We
were told when private probation was first permitted by specific states, such as Georgia or
Missouri. Furthermore, we are informed that in certain states private probation is not permitted
and as such did not operate in these areas. We were also informed of how the various regulations
(or lack of regulations) that states set up dictated what private probation organizations could and
could not do. One example of this was that probation departments could ask to obtain a warrant
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for a supervisee based on non-payment of fees, but the court had to sign off on a warrant before
it could be served by police (Harvard Law Review, 2015; Teague, 2016).
Second hypothesis. Probation privatization illustrated some elements of the Wacquant
(2012) hypothesis that neoliberalism entails a rightward tilt in the bureaucratic field from
protective to disciplinary. While the bureaucratic field was not captured by the PFP literature, we
can see examples of the transfer of populations in the PFP research. For instance, we see
populations from the courts were being transferred from public sector probation supervision to
private sector supervision. As the studies pointed out, this transfer also meant that these private
companies had the ability to fine these individuals. Thus, the transfer of populations also entailed
the transfer of resources associated with clients (Harvard Law Review,. 2015; Teague 2016). At
the same time, when these transfers of supervision occurred, there were also shifts in the services
that supervisees received, a change characterized by increased discipline and harsh economic
responsibilities.
Third hypothesis. All the PFP camps had themes of penal expansion. This was
evidenced by increases in the use of civil and criminal asset forfeiture (Holcomb et al., 2018;
Worrall 2001). As well, we saw increases in the ability of the court to enforce low level offences
(Harvard Law Review, 2015). Furthermore, penal expansion took the form of increased street
level criminalization (Stuart, 2016). The phenomenon also was illustrated by expanded use of
economic punishments for criminal and non-criminal activity (Henricks 2019; Teague, 2016).
Theoretical limits and Wacquant’s three steps to reconceptualization. Wacquant
(2012) called for a reconceptualization of neoliberalism that entailed three shifts. The first shift
was to view neoliberalism as a concrete political project with the aim of redefining citizenship.
The second shift was to understand that neoliberalism requires state activity in the project.
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Specifically, the state selects the institutional machinery necessary to establish market
dominance, and then the state establishes how market dominance will impact social membership.
Third, Wacquant called for the use of the concept of “the bureaucratic field,” which was made up
of the organizations that were able to monopolize the definition and distribution of public good.
It was suggested that by using the concept of the bureaucratic field, “the State” could be
understood as a space of forces struggling over monopolization of the definition and distribution
of public good and the power to define and address social problems.
Looking at the data available on PFP activities, it is unclear if the purpose of
implementation is to redefine citizenship. While redefinition of citizenship seems to occur in the
PFP literature as a matter of fact, the motivation remains unclear. For example, if we look at the
way the court changed the definition of “offender obligations,” it is apparent that citizenship was
also redefined, but the motivation for this redefinition was unclear (Harvard Law Review, 2015;
Sances & You, 2017; Teague, 2016). Moreover, given the available data, we cannot presently
investigate if implementation of private probation, increases in court fines, or even the increased
distribution of tickets by patrol officers, comes about as a result of the infusions of market
doctrine that makes such tactics seem logical or if the implementation of PFP is an intentional
shift influenced by the state, with the goal of changing the relation between state and citizens
(Wacquant, 2012).
According to Wacquant (2012), the promotion of the neoliberal project necessitates that
the state selects the institutional machinery that is needed to produce market dominance.
Additional theorization is needed to better understand what is being done with the institutional
machinery that allows policing for profit to take place. There are various tools, such as monetary
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punishment, forfeiture and warrants, associated with PFP, but understanding of their utility
remains undeveloped.
The design of the previous PFP studies was unable to adequately capture the activity in
the bureaucratic field. As mentioned, according to Wacquant (2012), neoliberalism entails a shift
in the bureaucratic field from the social hand of the state to the disciplinary and economic hand
of the state. As such, this previous research leaves us with the question about what the transfer of
populations and resources looks like and if PFP is used to achieve these ends.

Three Analyses
Combing through the various works that discussed the use of law enforcement power to
acquire revenue, three research perspectives or “camps” emerged, each with their own theoretical
purpose and explanations for PFP. By extension, each of these three perspectives gave a different
explanation of the role and motivation of the theoretical police officer in the task of PFP. Each of
these viewpoints perceived the drive to engage in revenue generating police activities as
originating from a different source.
The first group of studies (Camp 1) argued policing for profit could be understood as a
phenomenon directly related to economic needs and pressures experienced by individual police
departments. Furthermore, from this viewpoint the reason PFP activities were being carried out
across the country was due to national economic issues. Simply put, old funding streams were
impacted by national economic downturn and PFP was one avenue used to get departments back
in good financial standing. From this perspective, the individual officer could be understood as
working to keep their department afloat using various, though sometimes questionable methods.
The data Camp 1 researchers used to come to their conclusion was primarily derived from
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secondary analysis of survey data and self-report data from police personnel (Holcomb et al.,
2018; Lemos & Minzner, 2013; Mello, 2019; Phillips & Gayadeen, 2015; Worrall, 2001; Worrall
et al., 2008).
In the second group of studies (Camp 2), PFP is theorized to occur because officers are
ascribed such duties by police departments under the order of municipal governments. The
purpose of PFP here was to generate new revenue streams or to balance city budgets. In this
scenario, the theoretical officer has little choice in whether to engage in PFP. This was because
the officer was being coerced into PFP by city officials and by city policy itself. Data collected
for Camp 2 was meant to uncover city level activity that impacted police service provision.
Sources included court records, city budgets, and local policy review. Evaluation of data led
Camp 2 studies to concluded that municipal governments were pressuring departments into
certain styles of policing through the implementation of policy. Also important was that
obtaining revenue this way was concluded to be beneficial to city officials because it allowed for
the collection of additional revenue without tax increases, thus, producing funding for criminal
justice and non-criminal justice expenditures with fewer burdens than other forms of revenue
generation. The findings also revealed that there were more PFP efforts focused on poor and
Black populations (Garrett & Wagner, 2009; Goldstein et al., 2020; Harvard Law Review, 2015;
Henricks & Harvey 2017; Jaeger, 2016; Sances & You, 2017; Su, 2019).
The third group of studies (Camp 3) theorized that PFP was not as focused on revenue
generation as it appeared. Instead, PFP was being used because it allowed for police intervention
in the lives of non-criminals or in some cases the recently criminalized. In this way, PFP was
understood as a method to control and manage populations. In this camp, the role of the
theoretical officer was to reinforce a desired social order by issuing fines and tickets to certain
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people in certain places for certain activities. This camp included varied methodology, such as
legal reviews, cross cultural policy comparison, and direct observation of police and citizens.
Upon examination, Camp 3 found that PFP implementation had a severely disproportionate
impact on disadvantaged groups, but these studies were on conducted primarily in the southern
United States. This disparity highlighted how profit motivated policies and implementation of
economic sanctions had a disparate impact on poor citizens and Black Americans. Thus, studies
gave evidence that revenue generation was not the only end that could be achieved by engaging
in PFP (Collins, 2007; Henricks 2019; Jones, 2018; Singla et al., 2019; Stuart, 2016; Teague,
2016; Wamsley, 2019). For instance, as Henricks (2019) noted, economic sanctions were used as
a bureaucratic vail that allowed for a more palatable method of sustaining a racial/class order.

Introducing a fourth Camp
A limitation that all three of these camps of thought share is their view of the economy as
a purely natural force as opposed to a social construct. In this way, it is not surprising they
overlook the power of constructed economic technologies such as budgets, audits, benchmarks,
standards, etc., and the power they have to direct human behavior. Researchers focus on more
immediate agents such as police officers, judges, probation officers, and city officials (Rose et
al., 2006). This oversight leads to a lack of analysis regarding technologies and techniques of
governance, as we will see in the following sections. Due to the limited theorization of the first
three camps, moving forward will require the introduction of a fourth camp informed by
neoliberal theory (Ganti, 2014; Rose et al., 2006; Wacquant, 2012). This will aid in the
assessment of the varied methods and logics of governance involved in PFP. Specifically, this
camp will look at neoliberalism as a political project incorporating Wacquant’s three shifts in
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neoliberal conception. In this way, Camp 4 will be able to view intersections of the economic,
political, social elements of PFP in a way previous examinations of PFP have not (Ganti 2014;
Law, 1984; Rose et al., 2006; Wacquant, 2012).
As camp 4 will be based on Wacquant’s theorization of neoliberalism, it will need to first
capture the motivations of various actors and the struggles that take place over the manufacture
of meaning. Second, it will need to capture the identification and selection of institutional
machinery by the state, and third, allow for the identification of the “bureaucratic field” in which
these struggles play out. Thus, a fourth camp based on neoliberalism as conceptualized by
Wacquant (2012) will look to answer three questions to assess policing for profit as part of a
neoliberal state crafting project:
1. Is PFP associated with a political project aimed at redefining citizenship?
2. Was institutional machinery selected and used by the state to engage in PFP?
3. What organizations needed to be captured to promote PFP and were there
attempts to gain control of these organizations?
In order to answer the questions drawn from Camp 4 a potential study of asset forfeitures carried
out by police, exploitative city-level revenue generation, or the social control elements of PFP,
certain elements would need to be captured by the methodological framework (Ganti 2014; Rose
et al., 2006; Wacquant, 2012).
In the case of forfeiture, the chosen methodology would need to capture the impact of
forfeiture on citizenship. As well, it would need to capture the political aspects of forfeiture such
as introduction and expansion of use. To determine if increasing forfeiture use is part of an
intentional political project or the result of an uncoordinated infusion of market logic into state
operations, political and economic information would need to be captured. Specifically,
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information on political aspects, impact on business interests, and citizens accounts would need
to be collected in order to tease out motivations, be they market based or primarily political.
Thus, revealing information on the possible selection, implementation, and the purpose of such
activities. In order to determine how the bureaucratic field relates to forfeiture practices, a study
would need to determine what organizations advocate for the use of forfeiture, how the practice
is justified, and by whom (Ganti 2014; Rose et al., 2006; Wacquant, 2012).
A methodological framework aimed at examination of city level revenue generation
would need to capture similar data. Again, looking at city activity, as part of an intentional
political endeavor vs. as a market-based occurrence would require collection of data on how
revenue generation tactics impacted citizens and organizations. Inquiry would need to examine
who or what was being impacted by implementation and in what ways. In order to determine if
institutional machinery is being selected by the state, data would need to be captured that
examines what political and/or economic decision brought about the use of a revenue generating
method. Furthermore, to capture the bureaucratic field, it would be important to examine how
decisions were justified at the city level, what organizations were involved in these shifts, and
what organizations advocated and/or benefited from shifts in city policy at the local, county, or
federal levels (Ganti 2014; Rose et al., 2006; Wacquant, 2012).
Like asset forfeiture and city revenue generation, examining the potential of PFP as a
form of social control aimed at managing disadvantaged populations would require a
methodological focus to satisfy Camp 4 requirements. Thus, to determine if social control comes
about through intentional political shifts or as a byproduct of market-based activity there would
again be a need to uncover political and economic aspects of PFP. Furthermore, there would be a
need to explore how different segments of a given population are impacted and to seek out
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examples of oppressive vs liberating policy. Regarding institutional machinery, potential studies
would need to discover how particular initiatives came about, the stated purpose of
implementation, and what the actual impacts on citizens look like. The bureaucratic field would
again be examined using data on governments and organizations at the local, county, and
national level to see how these organizations produce different meanings that allow for different
social and political responses (Ganti 2014; Rose et al., 2006; Wacquant, 2012).
Moving forward, this fourth camp will be used to critique previous studies that set out to
explain various elements of PFP by assessing if core questions can be addressed or not.
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Chapter 5: Camp Analysis and Critique
The next three sections will each be broken down into a three-part analysis. The aim will
be to highlight first the theoretical assumptions of a given camp, and then the methodological
limitations. Each section will then conclude with the introduction of data that further highlights a
camp’s blind spots. This will be done by first briefly reviewing the shared theoretical framework
that unites the studies into a given camp. Next, there will be a critique of the methodology used
to examine PFP in each individual study, which will move into a discussion of why a given camp
4 question could or could not be answered by a camp. This will then be followed by the
introduction of data that further illustrates a given blind spot by highlighting data that could not
be captured by a camp but has been reported on a PFP tactic through other avenues outside of
sociological research for example a government report.

Camp 1: Departments in Distress
Camp 1 literature entailed studies that looked at PFP that was conducted by police
departments. It was explained that the ways departments could engage in PFP included civil
asset forfeiture, criminal asset forfeiture, and acquisition of conditional grants. Reports of rising
use of and reliance on revenue generating policing practices in departments motivated the camp
1 studies discussed in this section. Camp 1 studies worked under the theory that budgetary needs
had arose in police departments across the U.S., and in response, departments had begun
engaging in PFP activity and were reporting increasing levels of dependence. Furthermore, the
cause of these budget shortfalls was concluded to be out of the control of police personnel. The
data used to determine if departments were experiencing economic hardships and shortfalls was
self-reported data and surveys. Studies included data from the Law Enforcement Management
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and Statistics (LEMAS) survey, Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) records, and
Department of Justice (DOJ) civil and criminal forfeiture data (Worrall, 2001; Worrall &
Kovandzic, 2008; Phillips & Gayadeen, 2015; Lemos & Minzner, 2013; Holcomb et al., 2018;
Mello, 2019).
Acquiring a taste for PFP. The first of the Camp 1 studies of PFP that will be discussed
was done before the 2007 financial crisis. Worrall (2001) carried out a study to address critical
evaluations of police civil forfeiture practices. Critical claims before the study had posited that
civil forfeiture policy was creating an inappropriate economic incentive for officers and
departments. In response, the study set out to determine if departments that operated in areas
with more rewarding statutory incentives were policing for profit rather than crime control. Thus,
the design of the study was meant to answer if departments in areas with more rewarding
forfeiture laws carried out more asset forfeitures than areas with less rewarding forfeiture laws.
The study also looked at why departments believed they did or did not need to engage in
forfeiture activity
Survey data was collected from 1,400 law enforcement executives nationally to explore if
departments had become “addicted” to obtaining civil forfeiture money related to the war on
drugs. This study collected data from three sources, including the Policing Issues Survey of
1998, the civil and criminal codes of all 50 states and the District of Colombia, and LEMAS
survey data (Worrall, 2001).
Worrall (2001) concluded that in areas with more rewarding statutory incentives,
departments seized more assets. The survey data also showed that a budgetary dependence on
forfeiture revenue was reported by departments that engaged in more frequent forfeiture activity.
Worrall concluded that civil asset forfeiture had become a necessity for law enforcement
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agencies across the country and that these agencies were effectively "addicted" to the capital.
Specifically, the study found that agencies that had 100 full time officers or more (large
agencies) reported less need for forfeiture revenue. In addition, it was found that dependence of a
department was less likely the higher the fiscal expenditures of the agency. Moreover, around
40% of the large agencies surveyed found civil asset forfeiture necessary to supplement their
budgetary needs. Departments that had engaged in civil asset forfeiture in the past were more
likely to report dependence on this source of funding. The author concluded that beyond crime
control, organizational survival and financial stability were important considerations for law
enforcement agencies. Moreover, it was concluded that departments were not disregarding
functions such as crime control; instead, seizures were carried out to support the continued
functioning of those departments. The author reported this study to be a partial confirmation of
critical claims about economic incentives attached to forfeiture law (Worrall, 2001).
Policing for grants. The study done by Phillips and Gayadeen (2015) used data collected
after the 2007 recession. In this study, the 2007 economic crisis is presented as a pivotal moment
that was felt by many government institutions including the police. During this period, officers
were laid off across the country or furloughed for the sake of organizational survival. To assist
departments, new grants were made available directly to departments from the COPS office, also
referred to as COPS grants. The COPS office had been granted 1 billion dollars by the federal
government to distribute to police departments across the country as part of the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act or ARRA of 2009. The grants gave departments funding that
was to be used to hire on officers that would then be fully funded for three years, in exchange the
department had to implement community policing programs. Due to the rise of anti-federal
government sentiment across the country, it was thought that the police agencies in republican
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controlled areas would be reluctant or opposed to applying for COPS grants. In short, it was
hypothesized that administrators in republican (red) jurisdictions would not pursue the COPS
grants as frequently as democrat (blue) jurisdictions. The logic was that the grants would be
unpopular because they represented government funding and required expansion of government
through the avenue of community policing.
To explore police behavior, this study used data from the COPS office to see what
agencies received COPS grants. The study also collected congressional voting records and
results from the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections to operationalize the local political
environment, specifically to determine if an area was democratic or republican. The expectation
was that there would be far fewer red areas pursuing grants (Phillips & Gayadeen, 2015).
In contrast to the research hypothesis, the findings did not show a significant difference
in acquisition of COPS grants based on local political context. Unlike political context, crime
rate and economic conditions were found to be relevant. To explain this, Philips and Gayadeen,
posited that these results could be attributed to the effects of isomorphism. Institutional
isomorphism, as it was used in the study, was a concept drawn from organizational theory,
described as a constraining force that makes a unit in a population (in this case a police
department) resemble other units because of exposure to the same environmental condition. They
explain there are three types of institutional isomorphism These types include mimetic, where
organizations copy or mirror successful practices of others in the field; normative, where best
practices are adapted; and coercive, where pressure for change is driven by external regulation
structures, such as economic, legal, or political structures. They suggested that what was at play
in their study was a coercive isomorphism that resulted from economic influence that was more
powerful than the coercive power of local political influence. In this case, it was concluded that
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departments were willing to work with the federal government in exchange for funding since not
addressing crime was more of a threat to legitimacy than the political disapproval of acquiring
federal grants. Here again, results were suggested to indicate that departments had engaged in
PFP activities in order to maintain proper functioning or regain lost functionality (Phillips &
Gayadeen, 2015).
Civil asset forfeiture revenue. Holcomb et al. (2018) designed another study that set out
to address critical assessments of civil asset forfeiture. Here again, the reason for the research
was attributed to a need to address claims that PFP was a perversion of the police role. Like the
claims in Worrall (2001), critics in Holcomb et. al. (2018) argued that seizures were being
carried out by officers that were motivated by pressures put on them by departments seeking to
increase revenue unrelated to crime control ends. The authors set up their study to explore the
prevalence of policing for profit using civil asset forfeiture. Thus, the experiment looked at the
quantitative association between the burdens and rewards of all 50 state’s civil forfeiture laws
which were collected along with information on equitable sharing payments.
The data used included a sample of departments drawn from the 2013 LEMAS survey
which included 593 municipal police departments and sheriff's departments with 100 or more
officers. Next, the departments annually reported equitable sharing proceeds data from 2000 to
2012 was collected for each of these agencies. At the same time, the study also examined the
legal barriers and financial incentives that were present in each state. This was done to determine
whether departments operating in more rewarding states conducted more seizures (Holcomb et
al. 2018).
The results of the study were aligned with critical assessments of civil forfeiture. State
and municipal agencies with more restrictive forfeiture laws were more likely to carry out the
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forfeiture process through federal equitable sharing. For agencies with less restrictive state laws,
it was less likely that the department would use federal programs. Thus, it was posited that state
and local agencies were only working with federal authorities to subvert their own state or local
laws, which were more restrictive and less economically rewarding. Findings have evidenced the
occurrence of policing for profit and have provided additional evidence of economic influence in
policing (Holcomb et al., 2018).
Common to all these studies was a view that economic distress was present and
departments were reacting to it. Moreover, analysis was conducted on departments that relied
heavily on secondary data to evidence economic distress. As such, it was the officers themselves
that produced the understanding that there was economic distress. By looking at reports on
LEMAS surveys, where police officials reported economic needs, or by looking at the number of
departments that applied for grants, researchers concluded there were economic needs.
Therefore, in all of these “Camp 1” studies officers are the experts that were used to determine
economic need and it was assumed that this data was accurately reported (Worrall, 2001; Phillips
and Gayadeen, 2015; Holcomb et al., 2018).
Looking at the data on PFP from the Camp 1 viewpoint, it could be concluded that, in an
ideal world, one way to address the inappropriate use of PFP would be to issue more economic
capital to departments. Studies seemed to illustrate that police need more capital in order to
“operate efficiently”, and that departments are not adversely motivated by political or social
issues/ As such increased grant distribution seems like it would be an expedient solution for
addressing their needs, allowing pressure to be taken off officers. As the previous studies
indicate, there is mainly criticism of how officers are obtaining capital, as in the civil forfeiture
practices, but there is little discussion of issues with police proactively addressing capital deficits
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of their departments. In short, to ween problem departments from their dependence on PFP
funds, we would simply need to offer alternative funding. As we saw in Phillips and Gayadeen’s
(2015) study, departments appear to be willing to adjust their policing strategies in exchange for
capital. Therefore, more grant money could produce a reduction in undesirable outcomes, such as
“unnecessary” seizures. To determine the effectiveness of this solution, we would simply look at
LEMAS data and increase funding until no departments reported a need for additional funding.

Camp 1’s Theoretical Assumptions
As mentioned in previous sections, Camp 1 studies looked at PFP using secondary
economic data combined with survey data to understand policing for profit. More importantly,
policing for profit is presented as a department-based response to issues of finance. Due to the
focus on police departments, the impact of PFP activities on citizens was not specifically
addressed. We also saw that PFP activities were assumed to be carried out by departments
themselves. Furthermore, these initiatives were justified as there was not significant discussion
of any collateral consequences. Thus, PFP was presented as a situation where departments were
being driven to enact austerity measures, such as increasing civil asset forfeiture, adjusting
department strategies to qualify for grants, firing officers, cutting pay, etc., for the survival of the
department. Taken together, these studies assumed that the data reported by police that illustrated
financial strain was accurate. As well, findings were said to be useful for helping police address
these economic issues in the future (Worrall, 2001; Phillips & Gayadeen, 2015; Holcomb et al.,
2018).

Camp 1 Methodological Limits
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Looking at the Camp 4 questions and asking if they can be answered using the data and
findings of Camp 1, we see that they cannot be addressed. Upon examination of the Camp 1
studies, it is clear that the method of inquiry would not allow for an examination of PFP in a way
that would point to the intentions of anyone apart from the officers themselves and even those
motivations had to be assumed based on reported activity. Again, regarding the second question
about state selection of institutional machinery, there is no way to see such activity. This was
also an issue for understanding the existence of a bureaucratic field as the only organizations that
were seen to exist were local state and federal law enforcement and governments (Worrall, 2001;
Phillips and Gayadeen, 2015; Holcomb et al., 2018).
Political project vs. market doctrine. Based on findings of Camp 1, it is unclear if PFP
is related to an infusion of market doctrine or if PFP is related to a larger political project. As
such, there was no way these studies could have determined if PFP was part of a political project
aimed at changing the relationship between the state and citizens (Wacquant, 2012). Camp 1
studies revolved around the assumption that the economy was an uncontrollable force. This left
no room for investigation or discussion of socio-political issues. Due to this assumption, Camp 1
could only look at PFP as a result of uncontrollable economic issues. This sentiment is captured
in statements such as follows:
The general health of the United States economy ebbs and flows over time. […]
economic distress for individuals and organizations is inevitable, with contraction
occurring approximately every 17 years and, in recent decades, even more
frequently. (Giblin, & Nowacki, 2018, p. 172).
As we can see the economy is being discussed as if it were a natural force, like a
hurricane or a tornado, that comes and goes. These examinations assumed the best any
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organization could do would be to prepare themselves for forces entirely out of human
control, further demonstrating the belief that recurring economic disasters drove police to
engage in various methods to address their budget needs and deficits in the wake of
disaster.
Studies used tools such as survey data to draw conclusions about the financial
standing of police departments. In contrast, even with the economic focus of these
studies, there was only shallow discussion of how a department may have been managing
capital (Worrall, 2001; Phillips and Gayadeen, 2015; Giblin, & Nowacki, 2018; Holcomb
et al., 2018). In these studies, nothing seems to be social or political. While Giblin and
Nowacki (2018) pointed out that the local economic context, changes in crime rate, and
organization size were most closely associated with fiscal distress, studies did not
examine non-economic variables in depth. Instead, these variables are discussed as purely
natural forces. For example, “dropping” crime rate was associated with fiscal distress.
Yet the political aspects of crime were not discussed (Giblin, & Nowacki, 2018). This is a
critical omission as punishment rules are similar across the U.S., but definitions of crime
and crime statutes change from state to state and locale to locale (Hendricks, 2019).
Institutional machinery. If we looked at Camp 1 and attempted to ascertain if
the state selected institutional machinery in order to establish market dominance, we
would not be able to get an answer. While two of the Camp 1 studies could be addressing
the state use of institutional machinery, such as police power to carry out asset forfeiture,
but there would be no way to determine if this use of forfeiture was specifically aimed at
establishing market dominance. Instead, it would be more associated with organizational
survival. Moreover, there was no room for discussion of market dominance in the
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theoretical framework of these studies (Worrall, 2001; Phillips & Gayadeen, 2015;
Holcomb et al., 2018).
The bureaucratic field. Due to the police centric nature of the Camp 1 studies,
the makeup of the bureaucratic field could not be drawn from their findings. In the Camp
1 conception, there was no bureaucratic field, only police administrators working
independently for departments to keep departments “functioning” Worrall, 2001; Phillips
& Gayadeen, 2015; Holcomb et al., 2018).

Blind Spots
National trends in forfeiture. If we look at civil asset forfeiture and its impact
on citizens from another viewpoint, we see that there is a lot more going on with police
forfeiture activity than Camp 1 studies were able to capture. In a study carried out by the
institute of justice, Carpenter II, Knepper, Erickson, and McDonald (2015) highlighted
the prevalence of forfeiture by reviewing the protections against civil asset forfeiture in
all 50 states. The report points out how the civil forfeiture process allows officers to take
cash and property from individuals based on nothing more than suspicion that the
property is related to “criminal activity.” The agency that seized the property then
receives part or all the revenue made from selling the seized property. Moreover, the
report pointed out that in most of the states in America, there was very little protection
against the practice.
A few key statistics illustrated rising use of forfeiture. For instance, the Department of
Justice forfeiture fund went from 93.6 million dollars in 1986 to 4.5 billion dollars in 2014. In
addition to this increase, most of the forfeitures carried out have been civil forfeitures (83%) and
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not criminal forfeitures (13%; Carpenter II et al,, 2015). Moreover, once property is seized, the
property owner is left responsible for navigating through the complex, expensive, and timeconsuming legal process to win back their property. For many, especially indigent property
owners, this is not feasible. Thus, it is no surprise that 88% of DOJ forfeitures are classified as
administrative forfeitures meaning the property owner did not challenge the seizure in court for
some reason. For police departments on the other hand, there is another incentive beyond the
ease of gaining revenue; there are few limits on how forfeiture money can be spent due to lax
reporting standards. In the reporting of forfeiture revenue, the use of broad categories for
classifying expenditures immunizes the practice from public scrutiny. Additionally, missing data
in reports is commonplace. One example of vague reporting can be seen in the finding that eight
departments spent 42 million dollars in equitable sharing payouts in 2007, all reported under
“other.” Jumping forward, we see another example in 2014 when four states spent just under 14
million dollars and again classified expenditures under “other.”
Looking at the Institute of Justice data, we can see significantly more than what was
revealed by the Camp 1 findings. In the institute of justice report, forfeiture could be a tool that
allowed departments to avoid oversight. Equally important, in this report it was made clear that
there are national shifts in use of forfeiture. There was also a profound lack of protections from
forfeiture activity in most states (Carpenter II, et al., 2015).

Camp 4 Critique #1
The Camp 1 studies displayed shortcomings that could be addressed with a refined
understanding of neoliberalism. In these studies, the varied technology, people, and documents
that allowed and/or were required for forfeiture activity to occur went largely unexplored. The

REVENUE POLICING, SOCIAL CONTROL, AND NEOLIBERALISM

48

questions that were omitted further highlight blind spots in theorization (Worrall, 2001; Phillips
and Gayadeen, 2015; Holcomb et al., 2018). While camp one presents us with a scenario were
the economy is a natural force and departments are acting on their own accord, this story does
not hold up against the data from Carpenter II et al. (2015) that show forfeiture practices that
appear systemic. In this way, it appears that the issues with forfeiture are not a design flaw.
It seems this is not the story of a desperate or opportunistic department, but instead
represents a feature of the nation’s policing. In other words, it is not that the state is failing to
protect individuals from revenue policing, but instead that revenue policing may be intentionally
carried out. Considering Camp 1 findings and conclusions from the viewpoint of Camp 4 raises
questions such as where are the national forfeiture standards? Furthermore, why are national
forfeiture protections so inadequate across the country (Worrall, 2001; Phillips & Gayadeen,
2015; Holcomb et al., 2018)? It could be that instead of a failure to regulate, this phenomenon
exemplifies a national austerity measure, a tool for any agency that needs it. This would be one
way to devest but maintain social control functions and police presence as Wacquant (2012)
theorized. Or as Law (1986) said, a way to make potentially hostile elements work in favor of the
empire. As the Portuguese spice traders filled their sails with the winds that once hindered travel,
officers can turn potentially costly patrols and traffic stops into a way of propelling departments.

Camp 2: Local Government Coercion
The second camp that looked at PFP goes more in depth than camp 1 studies. In
these works, research moved back from a department/officer focus in order to look at
how police operated within the larger municipal system of criminal justice. By doing so,
these mechanisms of local government were found to have a close relation to police
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activity. In this theorization of PFP, police are coerced by local government to engage in
revenue generation. Furthermore, these studies looked at how the policies of local,
county, and state governments allowed, rewarded, and in instances coerced officers into
policing for profit. They also showed evidence that PFP tactics violated constitutional
rights of citizens. Equally important, these constitutional violations were found to have
had a disproportionate impact on disadvantaged populations specifically impoverished
black Americans (Garrett & Wagner, 2009; Harvard Law Review., 2015; Jaeger, 2016;
Henricks & Harvey 2017; Sances and You, 2017; Su, 2019; Goldstein et al., 2020).
Local government use of police. Harvard Law Review. (2015) looked at policing
for profit in the United States by taking an in-depth look at city level revenue generation.
Furthermore, the study gave examples of how the role of police was being diluted
through policing for profit activities in the state of Missouri and Georgia. The study
illustrates how the induction of profit focused policing could be unlawful.
The data used for this study is drawn from examinations of criminal procedure drawn
from three cases, including Ferguson, Missouri; Augusta, Georgia; and Montgomery, Alabama.
Data that highlighted how governments generate revenue using police was then gathered from
these cases. Furthermore, the review found that Ferguson was issuing 93% of the city’s fines and
fees to the Black majority that made up only 67% of the population. Moreover, the study found
the need for such extensive citation was attributed to the city’s budget. In the case of Ferguson,
around 25 % of the city’s annual revenue came from the imposition of municipal fines and fees.
By the same token, despite having 20,000 residents, 90,000 citations were given out between
2010-2014. Also, the city was aggressive in its attempts to convert fines into encounters with the
carceral state. As a result, violations of residents’ constitutional rights, specifically first, fourth,
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and 14th amendment rights, occurred frequently. Moreover, the city depended on police officers
to act as de facto collection agents for the municipal court.
The use of law enforcement to enforce debt was observed in Augusta, Georgia. In this
instance, the city’s officers carried out warrants on behalf of the private probation provider
Sentinel Offender Services. The use of probation services resulted in requirements such as tether
service, usage, and daily fees even in cases when such services were not part of the requirements
of the courts orders. This change to the probation department then related directly back to police
activity as Sentinel Offender Services would have police serve warrants for probationers if they
were unable to pay the private companies various fees for services and equipment. Those that
could not pay could be caught in an endless cycle in which probation leads to fees, fees lead to
warrants, warrants lead to court, court to jail. This cycle then starts over when the defendant is
released under private supervision to start accumulating more probation fees.
In Montgomery, Alabama, we are told of a 2014 case were a woman was arrested at her
residence for an unpaid parking ticket from 2010. The woman was handcuffed and taken to jail.
In the jail she was told that she could either pay $2,800 or stay in jail for 59 days. Unable to pay
with money, the woman paid her fine by staying in jail time, resolving the debt while she was
incarcerated at a rate of $50 a day.
Prevalence of Ferguson like cities. Considering the events that took place in Ferguson,
the questions were raised by Henricks and Harvey (2015) about how common activities like
those carried out by Ferguson police, court, and government officials were in other areas around
the United States. The focus of the study was to examine if cities and counties increased
“monetary punishments” (an alternate term used for fines and fees) in correlation with increases
in local economic pressures.
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Henricks and Harvey (2017) took a cross-section sample of 272 U.S. county and city
governments with populations of 65,000 or more, which were collected using secondary data
from the 2012 Survey of State and Local Finances. The researchers looked at three financial
variables including changes in property taxes 1977 to 2012, deficit spending for 2012, and
changes in police spending from 1977 to 2012. This study also looked at seven community
variables including percentage of Black residents, residents living below the poverty line, level
of income inequality, change in the Latinx (Latina and Latino) population between 1980 and
2012, population, property crime, and violent crime.
The findings indicated that of the three financial variables examined only one had a
significant impact on levels of monetary punishment. Contrary to the research hypothesis, a
city’s loss of property tax revenue was not found to have a significant impact on the levels of
monetary punishment, increased deficit spending was also insignificant. What did have a positive
impact on monetary punishment was city level police spending as a share of total city spending.
Of the 7 community variables, the findings showed that a higher percentage of Black residents in
a city was associated with higher use of monetary punishments (though it was noted this was
likely due to structural disparities in the treatment of Blacks not simply their presence).
Monetary punishments were also found to be associated with increases in the number of
residents without U.S. citizenship. Additionally, income inequality was connected to increased
monetary punishment. Interestingly, poverty level alone was not a significant indicator (Harvey
& Hendricks 2017).
Exploitative revenue: Who pays? Sances and You (2017) examined a sample of local
governments in the U.S. to figure out what conditions were associated with decisions to use fines
and fees as a method of local revenue generation. The study was done to look at connections
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between biased local revenue generation and Black representation. As the researchers pointed
out, bias in revenue generation was an area of policing that remained largely unexplored and
argued the topic deserved research attention due to the prevalence of bias in other areas,
specifically police stops. Also, the researchers used the example of the Ferguson government’s
use of biased revenue generation as an example of the issue. First, the police chief in Ferguson
was being pressured to produce more revenue using police officers. Second, Ferguson was a city
that was majority Black but had a majority White government. Thus, the design of the study was
such that these connections could be examined, using fines and revenue per capita as the
dependent variable and percentage of the population that was Black as the independent variable.
Data on municipal fines and fees imposed for violation of laws were collected from 9,143
American cities. Data was drawn from the 2012 Census of Governments (COG), a project of the
U.S. Census Bureau. The sample was limited to cites that were able to issue economic sanctions,
which meant they needed a police force and/or a court system. Cities with less than 2,500
residents were also excluded. As well, the 2010 U.S. Census was used to extract population data.
Analysis concluded that using fines as a form of revenue generation was commonplace.
The study further concluded that revenue generation using fines was strongly associated with the
percentage of the population that was Black. Of the cities in the sample, 86% collected more than
$0.00 per capita in revenue from fines and fees. Fourteen percent of the cities did not collect any
per capita revenue from fines and fees. The average amount of revenue was $8.00 per capita. The
rate went up by as much as $20.00 per capita based on the percentage of Black residents in the
community. Also, relevant was that the rising effect was reduced in areas with higher levels of
Black representatives on the city council.

REVENUE POLICING, SOCIAL CONTROL, AND NEOLIBERALISM

53

Camp 2: Theoretical Assumptions
Camp 2 inquiries looked at city level decision making as it related to institutions,
specifically courts and police departments, exploring how these institutions were
harnessed to gain revenue from citizens. In this theoretical camp, police were being
coerced by local governments to engage in PFP. This viewpoint revealed various political
elements that were required for PFP to take place. Still, the theorization is limited in
several ways. First, these studies focused on city level activity in a way that failed to
capture national patterns of revenue generation or national trends of PFP use more
generally. Second, there is no mention of officer discretion as it impacts enforcement
outcomes. Third in this conception, the economy is again seen as a force of nature apart
from any national economic choices or political shifts allowing for a level of justification
for city actions as well as police activity. Thus, in this camp it was theorized that cities
were engaging in PFP due to budgetary restraints or budgetary ambition not as part of a
greater end. Despite theorization that is primarily economic, findings suggest noneconomic drivers of PFP (Harvard Law Review ., 2015; Henricks & Harvey 2017;
Sances & You, 2017).

Camp 2: Methodological Limits
Looking at the Camp 4 questions as they relate to the second batch of studies, we see the
methods employed by Camp 2 moved past department/officer focused inquiries. Instead,
researchers examined police operation in the larger municipal system as well as mechanisms of
local government. The camp focus was policies of local, county, and state governments. Thus,
with its broader scope, Camp 2 produced findings that evidence the redefinition of citizenship at
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the local level, as there were activities occurring that impacted citizenship. Yet it was unclear if
these changes were driven by politics as opposed to market doctrine. For instance, was private
probation pursuing cities or were cities pursuing private probation? It was also unclear at what
point changes to citizenship took place. Regarding the second question, we can see that there was
institutional machinery being used, such as financial sanctions and police warrants, but it could
not be concluded if institutional machinery was being selected by the state. For the third
question, there was observation of organizations that could have made up a bureaucratic field but
observations were limited to organizations like courts, police, and private probation. There was
no clear direction of influence from one organization to the next (Harvard Law Review., 2015;
Henricks & Harvey 2017; Sances & You, 2017).
Political project vs market doctrine. When PFP was explored at the city level we saw
cases where local governments were using courts and police to extract revenue from poor
citizens in a systematic way. In some cases, this involved private probation companies. From this
viewpoint, PFP could be understood as a political initiative at the local level (Harvard Law
Review, 2015; Sances & You, 2017). As well, it was found that municipalities with large
populations of poor citizens and high income-inequality were associated with higher levels of
monetary punishments. This city level focus was common to all the Camp 2 studies and was
carried out without connecting these initiatives to activity at the national level. As such,
connections to a concrete political project are unclear. An example of this issue can be seen in
Henricks and Harvey (2017), which offers socio-historical background information on the city of
Ferguson, but no background information for the 272 county and city governments in the study.
Furthermore, the authors explained that Ferguson’s “heavy reliance on fines and fees was set in
motion years earlier by antibusing‐turned‐antitax movements that would pass a tax limitation
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provision in 1980, otherwise known as the Hancock Amendment” (p. 934). In addition, the study
mentioned that this legislation was like other legislation being implemented nationally in the
1970s and 1980s, but there was no discussion of any other state’s anti-tax legislation or
municipal legislation.
Institutional machinery. Was institutional machinery selected and used to establish
market dominance? Drawing from the Camp 2 findings, there is evidence that private probation
was used in some municipalities, while in others the court was issuing high amounts of court
debt (Harvard Law Review., 2015; Henricks & Harvey 2017; Sances & You, 2017).
The bureaucratic field. What organizations made up the bureaucratic field? From the
camp 2 findings it is unclear what organizations make up any bureaucratic field, though there are
observable organizations with various interests. At the same time, arrangements had the potential
to be mutually beneficial, so there is no way to pick apart which organizations may have been
working together or in opposition to gain control (Harvard Law Review., 2015; Henricks &
Harvey 2017; Sances & You, 2017).

Blind Spots
History of institutional machinery.
Civil infractions. To understand how institutional machinery is used, we must look at the origin
and history to understand continuity or divergence in use of the given tool (Horvath, 2014). Such
a historical understanding was largely absent from the Camp 2 studies (Harvard Law review.,
2015; Henricks & Harvey 2017; Sances & You, 2017). If we look for this history in Michigan,
for example, we see civil infractions were created in 1978. This was done to avoid the costs and
difficulties of providing a jury trial to everyone that violated the vehicle code. Before this was
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done, these violations were classified as misdemeanor crimes and carried certain protections.
With the creation of the civil infraction, the right to trial could be avoided. While the charge no
longer carried the status of a crime, this also allowed the burden of proof to be lowered to “strict
liability” meaning the offender is liable if they committed the act regardless of whether or not the
perpetrator had the knowledge or intention of committing the infraction. The civil infraction was
later expanded to other non-traffic centered activities. The tool was further expanded to allow
municipalities to create their own municipality based civil infractions or “municipal infractions”
(Riley, 2019).
Fines and fees: Magna Carta to Timbs v. Indiana. If we look further back, we see fines
have a long history as a tool of state power. For centuries there have been concerns about abuse
of fines and fees by state authorities. Despite the creation of various protections, abuses continue
to this day. In the supreme court case Timbs v. Indiana, supreme court chief justice Ginsberg
wrote the court’s opinion on the case which recounted the issues of fines and fees abuse in the
United states, as well as the English roots of American protections. Also included was a
discussion of constitutional protection from forfeiture as a type of excessive fine. Timbs v.
Indiana, 586 U.S. (2019).
The opinion points out that attempts to protect against the abuse of economic
punishments predates the United States. In England, the Magna Carta required that economic
sanctions should be proportionate. By this it was meant economic sanctions should not be so
large that they deny an offender their ability to secure the necessities of life. Despite the Magna
Carta’s requirements, economic abuse continued through the imposition of fines in England in
the 17th century. Sanctions were imposed by Stuart kings in one sense to raise revenue, but
critics point out they were also used to retaliate against political foes, chill the speech of political
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critics, and to detain those unable to pay debts indefinitely.” (Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. ___
(2019).
In the U.S., the eighth amendment’s excessive fines and fees clause was created to
protect against economic abuse. Yet in the aftermath of the civil war, “Black codes” were created
to maintain the prewar racial hierarchy. One method to achieve this was the imposition of,
“draconian fines for violating broad proscriptions on “vagrancy” and other dubious offenses”
(p.4). It is further pointed out that the 14th amendment was created to address this issue. During
the congressional debates of the 1866 Civil Rights Act which led into the creation of the 14th
amendment, involuntary servitude was repeatedly mentioned, illustrating an understanding of
how abuse based in fines and fees could be used as a form of social control. Timbs v. Indiana,
586 U.S. (2019). These abuses led to the adaptation of the present protections meant to shield
Americans against excessive fines and fees. The continued understanding being, “exorbitant
tolls” undermine constitutional liberties.
Fines and fees now. Holder (2015) explicitly states that the issues of PFP seen in
Ferguson are occurring on the national scale. As such, the origin of the practices is unlikely to lie
solely at the state or local level. Furthermore, Holder’s findings highlight the need for an
examination of the national factors that might explain a shift to PFP. As well, shifts cannot
simply be attributed to national economic issues. Erick Holder also pointed out that Ferguson
was a deeply polarized city. Moreover, according to the report, the polarization was attributed to
the conduct of the city, not citizens. In the city, both the municipal court and law enforcement
were being used primarily as instruments for raising revenue not a tool for providing public
services. Conversations with police revealed pressure to raise money for the city, a pressure
found to contribute to issues such as frequent street and vehicle stops that had no legal
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justification. Again, it is also important to note that while the issues of PFP were especially
intense in Ferguson, these were not isolated issues and were not confined to any one city, state,
or region of the United states.
Forced Consumption. Examining the activities of Sentinel Offender Services recalls
Delia-Deckard’s (2017) research, which theorized the utility of PFP in prisons for generating
“new” revenue streams with the concept of “forced consumption.” This piece posits that “forced
consumption” is used to compel minimally market attached citizens to participate in the market
as consumers, increasing national demand. This profit driven strategy is seen as necessary by
U.S. governments because of a shift in the U.S. market from needing bodies for production of
goods and services to a need for consumption of surplus goods and services. A tool like forced
consumption can help conceptualize what was taking place when cities in the U.S. opened their
populations to the private market by handing off probation departments to for-profit probation
companies (Harvard Law Review, 2015).
Operationalizing variables. Another issue in the Camp 2 studies was the way that
variables were operationalized. Examples of this issue include the way municipal and county
departments were operationalized under “law enforcement agencies.” This is an issue because
the power municipal governments have over their local police force is not the same as the power
they have over county police.
The second issue was the way police spending was operationalized as it failed to consider
spending variation by only considering spending in terms of dollar amount (Hendricks &
Harvey, 2017).
First, Harvey and Hendricks (2017) combined data on municipal and county law
enforcement agencies. This is problematic as these organizations operate under different
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guidelines with varied objectives, duties, funding sources, and organizational objectives (Riley,
2019). If we look at Michigan as an example, Riley (2019) explains, in A Primer on Michigan’s
Criminal Justice System, that in the state there are 588 separate agencies operating in
jurisdictions such as counties, villages, townships, tribal areas, parks, universities, community
colleges, schools, airports, and railways. If we look at the statewide police force, county-based
departments, and municipal police departments we see they all operate under different guidelines
set by different governing bodies (Riley, 2019).
For instance, the structure and activities of the Michigan State Police (MSP) is set by
Michigan state law. MSP responsibilities include patrolling state highways and assisting local
law enforcement agencies and governments. Funding is also unique as the agency is funded
primarily by the state’s general fund along with service sharing agreement revenue, federal
grants, and private grants (Riley, 2019).
The duties of county sheriff's departments are based on statute and case law. They are
tasked with operating the county jail, providing service at the courthouse, and monitoring under
policed areas. In contrast to state police, they are not specifically tasked with overseeing local
law enforcement agencies. The structure of the county sheriff’s offices in Michigan is set such
that each county is bound by the Constitution to elect a sheriff. The sheriff then serves a four
year term and is constitutionally required to be “independent and accountable”. Additionally, the
sheriff cannot serve any other office during their term (Riley, 2019). Funding for the sheriff’s
department comes from the local taxes raised by their county commission.
Municipal departments in Michigan have a number of unique features compared to state
and county departments. For one, they are not required by the constitution. The police chiefs of
these departments are hired by the municipal government. Services provided by departments
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vary from one municipality to the next and can include policing activity such as, responding to
calls for service, patrolling, and criminal investigation. Services can include more specific
activities to respond to the “unique needs” of a jurisdiction. Local departments are funded by the
municipality that employs them. To do this, a city/town can use special taxes, sell bonds, and
obtain grants from the state or federal government. It is stated in Riley (2019) that one benefit of
having a municipal police department is the ability of the community to support the policing
services that serve its specific needs and simultaneously maintain control over how services are
provided by the department (Riley, 2019).
This takes us into the next issue the operationalization of police spending. As we can see,
departments can have different goals and are especially able to pursue these goals at the
municipal level. Therefore, it is unlikely police activity would be uniform due to the unique
needs of an area and due to a municipalities ability to pursue those needs. What police spend
their budget on is likely to differ greatly from place to place. Further complicating measurement
is that police spending patterns are difficult to compare based solely on police budgets since the
reporting style changes from place to place as we can see in Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3
(City of Ann Arbor, 2018,; City of Flint 2018; City of Warren, 2019 ).
So again, Henricks and Harvey (2017) found an association between “police spending” as
a share of total city spending and higher monetary punishment. But in this case, spending by
police departments was treated as a uniform variable, which is problematic as police spending
can entail wide variation in expenditures at the municipal level. As Figures 1-3 illustrate, in the
cities of Ann Arbor, Flint, and Warren, two things are apparent. The first, what is included on the
budget varies and second how things are categorized in these reports varies. For instance, in
Figure 2, we see there is an entry on Flints budget for a “city lock up” expenditure, and Figure 3
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shows warren has an entry for “Prisoner’s food.” On the other hand, Figure 1 does not have an
entry related to a lock up or prison. But this does not mean police in Ann Arbor don’t lock
people up as the expenditure could be under some other entry. Looking at categorization in these
city budgets we see in some cases, officer pay is its own category and in other cases it is not
explicitly listed. This could mean the expenditure is bundled into a category such as
“investigations” or “patrol” or it may be in a different section such as “payroll.” In this way, it is
unclear if police budgets even include all the capital spent on police by a city. Furthermore, it is
unclear what agencies are even being referred to in these budgets (City of Ann Arbor, 2018; City
of Flint 2018; City of Warren, 2019).

REVENUE POLICING, SOCIAL CONTROL, AND NEOLIBERALISM

Figure 1. Ann Arbor police spending
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Figure 2. Flint Police Spending
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Figure 3. Warren Police Spending
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Camp 4: Critique #2
Looking at Camp 2 examinations of city level PFP activity, it again seems that questions
could be better understood using Camp 4 insight. Evidence suggests that city level PFP activities
may not be a bug in the system, but a design element of policing strategies more broadly. These
pieces center around the idea that PFP is occurring as a result of city level decision-making and
“natural” economic shifts (Harvard Law Review., 2015; Henricks & Harvey 2017; Sances &
You, 2017). It is apparent civil and municipal infractions are not old tools that have been sitting
dormant, only recently utilized in the wake of economic hardship. Instead, evidence shows this
institutional machinery came into being more recently and represented a major increase in
policing power that has been mobilized across the country at increasing rates since its
introduction. Also, there isn’t a full examination of municipal power and this is especially
problematic considering the ability of municipal governments to create their own infractions.
There are additional concerns about the level of autonomy municipal agencies seem to wield. As
well, the power of municipalities to collect money and the subsequent expenditure of the
acquired capital remains largely unexplored (Riley, 2019; Wacquant, 2012).
In the same way in Harvard Law Review (2015), while private probation may appear to
be chosen based on marketized logic of greedy or desperate state officials, that is too enticing to
pass up, this framing overlooks several features of probation privatization. While the city
officials had the power to use privatized probation services the state was the gatekeeper to this
option. In Sances and You (2017) we were also introduced to data on federal divestment from
many past responsibilities, so it seems possible this is part of the same larger trend of divestment,
yet the link is not made. These activities are being carried out by both government and quasiautonomous entities, but the way they may be governed at a distance using “budgets, audits,
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standards, benchmarks, and other technologies that were both autonomizing and reponsibilizing”
(Rose et al., 2006, p. 91) was not considered.
This policing formation may be intentional as there are varied benefits that could be
drawn from this arrangement though this possibility is not addressed By putting most of the
police power at the municipal level and allowing the agencies to fund themselves using varied
methods such as forfeiture, fines, fees, etc., a great deal of policing power as well as economic,
social, and political power is placed at the local level, thus making meaningful national policing
reform more difficult. Municipal fines and fees may represent another austerity measure meant to
allow the state to devest while maintaining or expanding policing functionality (Harvard Law
Review., 2015; Henricks & Harvey 2017; Sances & You, 2017). Again, Camp 2 evidence seems
to point to a failure of policy not an intentional plan in which a state desire for revenue policing
is a possibility.

Camp 3: Unprofitable Social Control
The studies that follow presented evidence focused on the non-economic utility of
engaging in PFP. To do this, Camp 3 first showed PFP was often unprofitable, then went on to
highlight the social harm produced by these same policies. From this approach, it was illustrated
that an important byproduct of PFP was a heightened level of social control. Control that could
be focused on certain populations based on how enforcement was carried out. Data was collected
with methods including ethnography and case studies. These studies moved beyond a focus on
financial turbulence/gain as motivators and looked at intersections between social, political, and
economic issues (Collins, 2007; Stuart, 2016; Teague, 2016; Jones, 2018; Henricks 2019; Singla
et al., 2019; Wamsley, 2019). Furthermore, Camp 3 suggested that a disproportionate enforement
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of PFP measures put certain groups in the crosshairs of enforcement while other citizens were
left undisturbed (Henricks, 2019; Stuart, 2016). In addition, it was shown that using economic
language, racially unequal policing could be carried out while sustaining legitimacy. This was
concluded to be a necessary strategy as avoiding reference to race allowed for the subversion of
race based legal protections (Henricks, 2019). Thus, from this viewpoint the increased use of
PFP was not primarily driven by economic strife or even government ambition/greed. Instead,
PFP was being used for social control because other methods had been prohibited and could be
easily detected and policed by state or federal authorities/regulations.
Cross examination. Teague (2016) compared American and U.K. probation use
illustrating the higher use in America. More importantly, the study found that the American
probation system allowed the use of offender-funded probation, whereas the U.K. did not. It is
further explained that the purpose of offender funded probation was that privatizing the
probation department and having “offenders” pay the tab would save cities money. To indicate
the issues with this assumption, a case study was carried out that analyzed offender-funded
probation in the state of Georgia,
The analysis of Georgia revealed what Teague (2016) described as a “dystopian vision”
of probation privatization. In Georgia, despite a court decision that ruled that offenders should
not be put in jail for their debts, the practice still took place. It was explained that private
probation departments in Georgia held a great deal of sway over the courts’ decisions and failure
to pay supervision fees could and often did lead to jail time. For those individuals on probation
there was an ever-looming possibility of arrest due to the power these private companies had
over law enforcement. There had even been claims that private probation officers had been
threatening poor people with arrest if they came to a probation meeting unable to pay fees.
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Teague (2016) found in the U.S. there were high levels of individuals under state
supervision, specifically noting that 34 state-registered private probation companies were in
operation in Georgia as of 2013. In addition, Georgia had Four times more people on probation
for misdemeanor offenses when compared to the national average. Of all those on probation, 80
percent were being supervised by private probation companies. Another important finding was
that many of those on probation were on something called “pay only probation.” Pay only
probation meant a person was being put on probation as a result of the individual’s inability to
pay a court fine such as a parking ticket at the time of the initial trial. This is an important
finding as it illustrates the net widening capacities of PFP.
While Teague (2016) concluded that many private probation companies in the U.S.
operated in an ethical way, it was pointed out that various cases raised social, fiscal, and political
concerns. These issues with the privatization of probation were seen as a result of insufficient
regulation. The study further concluded that lack of regulation allowed for a focus on revenue
generation over rehabilitation.
Neighborhood level. Stuart (2016) looked at “Skid Row” Los Angeles to examine
community level consequences of police saturation as it related to increases in street level
criminalization that took place in Los Angeles. To contextualize the police presence in the area,
the researcher explained that Skid Row was only 0.85 square miles but that over 80 Las Angeles
Police Department (LAPD) central officers were deployed there in 2006 to enforce an aggressive
zero tolerance policy. Furthermore, in the first fiscal year of operating at this level of police
deployment, the central division made 9,000 arrests and issued 12,000 citations. While
researchers have accumulated a great deal of research on the issues that manifest as a result of
conviction, such as exclusion from sectors of society due to the felony label. The author explains
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that the effects of this level of policing are rarely explored. Thus, the study set out to understand
reactions to police presence at the neighborhood level.
Five years of ethnographic work in the Skid Row area was the source of data in the study.
The study started in 2007 consisting of 10-30 hours of fieldwork in the neighborhood per week.
Public spaces, private residences, and neighborhood institutions were observed. Informal
interviews took place with patrol officers, police supervisors, residents, and peer groups. The
daily activities of two groups were the primary source of data. These groups included residents
that visited and socialized in one of the areas two pocket parks. The other observation group was
made up of 14 street vendors. The objective was to focus on the newly criminalized people and
mundane activity that had recently started to receive police attention, instead of those involved in
serious criminal activity that had been policed in the past.
Stuart concluded that the aggressive police presence in Skid Row created a cultural
context were the threat of arrest lead residents to engage in various maladaptive behaviors.
Furthermore, these behaviors were comparable to those observed in high crime areas.
Specifically, behaviors seemed to be a result of the higher likelihood of being stopped in these
areas and looked like those used in high crime areas used to avoid being victimized, robbed, and
extorted. Though in this case police officers were eluded to avoid victimization. Thus, it was
concluded the zero-tolerance policing strategy, in combination with the fees and fines that a
resident risked receiving simply from walking or driving around the area, were connected to
significant harm in the community (Stuart 2016).
Mandatory financial punishments. Henricks (2019) pointed out an omission in studies
of state power. Specifically, that bureaucratic documents had largely been overlooked as sites of
power. As such, the author examined a sample financial sanctions to assess their potential as
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sites of state power. In addition, the analysis entailed looking at the sample documents’ potential
to reproduce inequality. To explore the relationships between race, crime, and punishment, the
author looked at the mandatory punishments that could be applied in the criminal division of
Cook County, Illinois, as of 2016. The sample of sanctions included mandatory financial
sanctions that could be identified at the state and county level. Cook County was argued to be
representative of urban spaces across the U.S. for four reasons. First, the area was a hypersegregated metropolitan area. Also, the area experienced a crime decline similar to drops seen
across the U.S. Third, Cook County had an overwhelming demand on its government for public
works and social services. Finally, the punishment rules in the area reflected those around the
country.
Data was drawn from the various legal documents that contained “mandatory financial
sanctions.” Sanctions were identified in the Illinois compiled statutes, the Illinois counties code,
the Illinois vehicle code, the Illinois clerks of courts act, as well as Illinois criminal code,
guidelines on criminal procedure, and unified code of corrections. In all, 89 mandatory financial
sanctions were identified (Henricks, 2019).
The findings illustrated the varied benefits to the state, as well as the mundane violence
that is inflicted from this form of punishment. Mandatory financial sanctions were found to
reproduce racial inequality in three ways. First, the conviction process was removed from its
highly racialized context and, as such, those factors were not discussed in court. What this meant
is issues of racial bias in policing such as a higher search rate during vehicle stops for Blacks
compared to Whites was not considered during trial. As well, the issue of what was being policed
was being omitted from discussion. For instance, while possession of a controlled substance
could lead to a debt of over 2,000 dollars, white-collar crime was only subject to a sanction of

REVENUE POLICING, SOCIAL CONTROL, AND NEOLIBERALISM

71

$75-110 dollars. Secondly, mandatory sanctions used a layered system of compulsory and
discretionary judgment that allowed for further entrenchment of racial bias. In short, by putting
the authority of punishment into written rules, instead of judges and leaving it for police and
prosecutors, a degree of separation was added such that no criminal justice actor had to feel
directly responsible for the punishment. Instead, responsibility was put entirely on the defendant
and attributed to their individual pathology. Third, mandatory financial sanctions redistribute the
costs of criminal justice operations onto those that were being put through the system (Henricks,
2019).
In all, we saw that in Cook County using mandatory financial sanctions was a highly
racialized process that allowed for specific targeting of economic harm. Even though on paper
there was no mention of race, the impact was reminiscent of other outlawed economic methods
of social control such as “Black codes.” Moreover, despite the absence of racial language the
formation of sanctions could still be seen as being focused on certain minority populations for
low level crimes. This was evidenced in the fact that even if a municipality attempted to use this
strategy in a nondiscriminatory way regarding enforcing it still would be biased based on how
the statutes are written. For example, even if there were an equal number of drug offenders and
white-collar criminals the sanctions would still produce more harm for the low-level crimes as
those carried higher penalties (Henricks, 2019).

Camp 3: Theoretical Assumptions
Camp 1 and 2 looked at PFP from the viewpoint of police departments and city
governments, in contrast the theoretical focus of Camp 3 was on citizen experiences. In this way,
the theoretical frameworks of Camp 3 studies allowed for the theorization of the possible social
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control elements of PFP and their impact on individual citizens lives. Camp 3 studies looked at
the social control aspects of PFP activities. In this way, these studies were able to explore if PFP
could limit freedoms and how financial means could be used by state and private actors to
produce socially limiting ends (Henricks, 2019; Stuart, 2016; Teague, 2016).

Camp 3: Methodological Limitations
Looking at the Camp 4 questions as they relate to Camp 3 studies, we see researchers
were able to highlight additional elements of PFP by examining the impact of police operation,
institutional machinery, and citizen experiences. The camp focus was on social control elements
and social harms of PFP as they related to people. Thus, camp 3 produced additional findings
that evidenced the redefinition of citizenship, as there were activities occurring that impacted
citizenship such as increased criminalization. First, in these studies it was possible to see how the
state as opposed to market doctrine influenced policy. It was also clear changes to citizenship
were a common element of PFP policy implementation. Regarding the second question, we can
see that there was institutional machinery being used, such as fines and fees, mandatory financial
sanctions, but it could not be concluded if institutional machinery was being selected by the
state. For the third question, since the focus was on citizens there is not consistent examination of
the interests vested in expanding social control (Henricks, 2019; Stuart, 2016; Teague, 2016).

Blind Spots
Political project vs. market doctrine. Looking at the Camp 3 studies, it is unclear if
PFP was taking place due to market doctrine or due to a political project. What we do see is the
redefinition of citizenship based on the introduction of different PFP tactics (Henricks, 2019;
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Stuart, 2016; Teague, 2017). Henricks (2019) looked at mandatory financial sanctions revealing
the way in which making a punishment mandatory at certain points and discretionary at others
allowed for a reproduction of racially unequal ends. However, it was unclear if the ends being
achieved were influenced by market doctrine that saw minorities as economically problematic, a
particular political agenda, or some other forces. Thus, in this examination, the motivation for
these activities as political or market based was unclear. Teague (2017) set out to examine race,
crime, and punishment by looking at offender funded probation in the U.S. as compared to
probation provision in the U.K. Ethical issues of the practice were highlighted, as there were
individuals being incarcerated based solely on their inability to pay service fees. We saw how the
introduction of offender funded probation and pay only probation allowed the incarceration of
supervisees that traditionally would not be supervised by a public probation department. Also, it
was clear that in some instances the protections that were given in public probation were not
allocated in the private form of probation. Still, because there were both public and private actors
that had to sign off on such an arrangement, it was unclear if market actors or political actors
were the ones pushing for these shifts. In addition, while the study concluded that lack of
regulations led to a focus on profits, it was unclear if private probation departments were acting
on their own accord or if such activities were being permitted by other actors.
Of the Camp 3 studies, Stuart (2016) was the most able to capture the possible existence
of a political project that was being pursued using policing for profit. This was because this study
was one of the few that discussed political decisions made by individuals that led to PFP based
shifts. In this study, we learn about the ways that increased street level criminalization connected
to PFP since it was through the issuing of fines for recently criminalized activity that a form of
social control was enacted. While in other studies the activities of PFP were abstracted from their
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impact on communities, especially in Camps 1 and 2, here we learn more about what can happen
at the street level when fines and fees are issued at a drastically increased rate. Furthermore, by
focusing on the newly criminalized and increasingly criminalized activities, the study gave a
more comprehensive explanation of how citizenship was being redefined. Here we can see the
utility of engaging in ethnographic work as other studies may have looked at the same
phenomenon using a viewpoint that would miss the social harms of policing for profit and the
ways that it impacted citizens
Institutional machinery. Henricks (2019) examined local context allowing us to see the
methods that put the power over decisions to punish defendants into the written rules. One issue
was, this piece moves away from civil and municipal fines and fees and toward criminal
punishments. As such, there is no discussion of statutory inequality as it relates to civil fines and
fees. Stuart (2016) gave a clear example of fines and fees being implemented as a part of a zero
tolerance police initiative but did not discuss its selection in depth. The piece examines the goals
of this initiative noting a desire to produce a higher level of social control. As well, the police
actors and agency that spearheaded the initiative locally are discussed. What is unclear is how
these activities do or do not relate to the larger American government’s initiatives.
The bureaucratic field. In Camp 3 studies, the bureaucratic field could not be captured.
These studies focused on state agents, limiting the possibility of discovering other parties that
influenced shifts to PFP. Henricks (2019), for instance, primarily highlighted the court and police
as the main organizations responsible for the mandatory financial sanctions being discussed. At
no point did we learn of other possible state or market initiatives or organizations that may have
influenced the development of the wide array of sanctions that existed at the local, county, and
state level in Cook County. In Teague (2017), the bureaucratic field appeared to be made up of
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private probation companies, local governments, police departments, and courts. It seemed that
in all the Camp 3 studies the federal government isn’t seen as a possible driving force for these
changes directly or indirectly (Hendricks, 2019; Stuart, 2016, Teague, 2017). But we saw in the
examination of Camps 1 and 2 blind spots, what is written off as a hiccup in an otherwise
appropriate policing system can actually be a local example of a problematic national policing
strategy. As we saw with forfeiture, allowing or encouraging exploitative revenue policing is a
national phenomenon, but only certain studies captured the national scope (Carpenter et al.,
2015; Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S., (2019)

Camp 4: Critique #3
In Camp 3, there are additional research limitations that can be addressed with a better
understanding of neoliberalism. This is not to say these studies were not useful, as they examined
how revenue policing could go beyond the goal of revenue generation in a way that other studies
did not. In the same way, these researchers pointed to the reproduction of inequality as a primary
capacity of expanded use of PFP. The issue is that they did not adequately theorize a motivation
for these shifts. This again limits theorization to conclusions that see these occurrences as an
error in the system not as a feature or intention of PFP policy design (Wacquant, 2012).
The social and ethical issues of policing for profit were elucidated by Camp three but
there was a lack of theorization on the utility of the harms being produced, as was the possibility
of non-criminal justice actors or agencies intentionally producing a particular social impact.
Instead, the focus was on the harms produced, justified by the state as punishment, debt
enforcement, and local order maintenance efforts. Camp 3 studies showed PFP to be a highly
complex phenomenon in comparison to what was described in Camps 1 or 2. While PFP in this
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camp was used for the control and management of poor citizens, the motivation for this activity
was unclear, as there were both public and private interests involved in the formation of these
PFP regimes. Drawing from this data set it could be surmised that the federal government would
have gotten involved in addressing abuse at the state or local level, but could not due to a lack of
legislation that specifically prohibits these sorts of PFP policies and practices. In this way, the
federal government could be understood as lagging in regard to the regulation of PFP (Henricks
2019; Stuart, 2016; Teague, 2016).
There is an understanding in Camp 3 that the role of economic structures in policing can
be, aiding in the development of systems that extend social control, but no explanation is given
for why particular people are being policed. In this way, it appears that PFP use that violates civil
rights is a failure of policy or regulation and the use of economic structures to conduct targeted
or tiered police enforcement isn’t an intentional design element of policing more broadly. One
could conclude that these issues could be fixed by adapting policy to prevent city level abuse
(Rose et al., 2006; Wacquant, 2012). This is problematic as other evidence suggests it would not
(Carpenter II et al., 2015; Delia-Deckard, 2017; Holder, 2015; Riley, 2019; Timbs v. Indiana,
586 U.S., 2019)
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Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion
Discussion
Data on PFP illustrated the tiered impact of policy implementation and enforcement.
From this data it was unclear if discontinuity of justice was an unintentional policy oversight or a
feature of contemporary American policing and criminal justice efforts. In the examination of
PFP we saw recurring evidence of the Wacquant (2012) neoliberal political project. Thus,
additional research needs to be carried out to examine the role of economic structures in policing
in order to further academic understanding of PFP. In this section, we will discuss the findings
that pointed to economic distress as the cause of PFP, arguing that they were imprecise
especially given the national scope of many of these practices/policies. Next, we will discuss a
recent supreme court case Timbs v Indiana in which in rem (of the property) forfeiture was found
to be applicable for 4th amendment excessive fines protection and the relevance of the case to
PFP research. Following this will be an inquiry into missing data on the direction of influence
and tracking of PFP. The section will conclude by discussing how the lack of oversight of PFP
activities reflects a longer history of similar issues of social control using economic structures
throughout U.S. history.
Cause of PFP. A shared economic hardship does not explain or connect these cases, as
many cities are expanding through these PFP activities. They may instead resemble each other as
a result of the rules and regulations on PFP activities such as civil asset forfeiture, municipal
fines and fees and government privatization. Looking at these cases highlights how external
constraints from the laws gave these cities tools for creating a similar environment where
pursuing PFP is possible if not logical. The findings of Harvey and Henricks (2017) suggest that
PFP is not solely driven by a profit motivation this is evidenced in the lack of PFP in poor cities
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except in instances where income inequality is present. We could be witnessing a shift as
described by Wacquant (2012) in which the state is being redeployed through the creation of
national policy that influences the creation of these local government policies and facilitated a
neoliberal reorganization of government at the local level (Wacquant 2012).
What the money is used for is a crucial omission of most of the literature on PFP. There
is anecdotal information on how courts use money to fund different programs in Ferguson we
saw that money collected at least partially went to expansion of local government (Harv. L. Rev,
2015). We also are told that a low amount of drug war related forfeiture money goes to drug
programs (Carpenter et al., 2015). Still, for the most part the ways PFP capital is used remains
unexplored. What about redistribution? While Henricks (2019) points out how Cook County is
similar to other locales across the U.S. since, “like many other locales in the United States, [the]
demand for social services and public works overwhelms the government’s ability to pay for
them” (p. 4). So is PFP being used to provide services, or as Wacquant (2012) would suggest is
the revenue being used to police insecurity and disorder using courts and police through penal
expansion?
Recent cases. There have been developments in the regulation of PFP practices, but the
impact of these developments remains unclear. In the case of Timbs v. Indiana, police seized
Timbs’s Land Rover valued at $42,000 after he was arrested for selling $400 worth of heroin.
The forfeiture was contested, but the state pursued the case arguing that the vehicle had been
used to transport drugs, so it could be seized. In Indiana trial court the state’s request to seize the
vehicle was denied as the car was worth more than four times the maximum charge that could be
applied for the crime that Timbs pled guilty to. The case was then affirmed in the Indiana court
of appeals and was heard by the Indiana supreme court. In the Indiana supreme court there was
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no judgment of excessiveness, instead it was held that the eighth amendment is only applicable at
the federal level. The case was taken to the supreme court. In the supreme courts majority
opinion, the court ruled against the state of Indiana asserting two points. The first being that in
the previous case Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602, the court had already ruled
unanimously that civil in rem (against the property) forfeitures are fines as they relate to 8th
Amendment protections cases where they are at least partially punitive. Second, that the court’s
decision that the excessive fines clause applies to civil in rem forfeitures is itself fundamental or
deeply rooted, remained unchanged (Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S., (2019).
While such a case could represent a move towards more regulation of and protection
against one form of policing for profit for citizens, it was an extreme case. Here the vehicle being
taken was worth over four times more than the highest possible fine. There is no telling how
many other cases failed to even be heard much less make it to the supreme court. Also, we see
here that even though the supreme court had already ruled that excessive in rem forfeitures were
unconstitutional, assets were still being seized (Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. (2019).
Theoretical Context. Much of the literature on PFP lacks theoretical context, and as
such many questions go unstated. We see that at the department level police are reporting that
they need capital, but it is not fully explained what capital is needed for, what capital is spent on,
or what the impact on departments would be if they do not get said funding (Giblin, & Nowacki,
2018; Holcomb et al., 2018; Phillips & Gayadeen, 2015; Worrall, 2001). This should be
investigated because as Wacquant (2012) stated that an “extensive pornographic penal policy” is
one of the institutional logics used to advance the neoliberal project. In the same way, Vitale
(2017) points out, over the last few decades, the police role has expanded into schools, mental
health work, management of homelessness and goes on to argue this has been an exceptionally
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expensive way to address the given issues in each realm. Penal expansion was evidenced as was
the need for more capital to facilitate potential expansion (Wacquant, 2012). This was also true
of the review of revenue policing data.
In Harvey and Hendricks (2017), local government spending on “police” as a share of
total spending is used as an empirical indicator of higher monetary punishment. The omission of
differentiation in expenditure data makes tracking problematic as police spending is presented in
a way that insinuates higher city level spending on police is associated with a greater likelihood
of a certain form of policing regime. That regime being one that issues more monetary
punishments as we saw in Ferguson. This is problematic because expenditures were not
examined and then found to be uniform across departments, instead police spending was
arbitrarily made uniform. While uniformity in spending patterns is possible it is only one
possibility among many. A city may spend a high percentage on “police,” but what police
spending entails could vary greatly. Ignoring the variations in police spending misses the
potential political, social, and economic power of spending or not spending capital on any given
budget entry (Henricks, 2019). Skipping over potential variation in budgets is also problematic
because, as Vitale (2017) noted, policing is being used in attempts to address social problems
like school discipline, homelessness, and the management of mental health. In this way spending
on police entails efforts to address any number of issues. By making police expenditure a
uniform category there is no differentiation from one case to the next and important contextual
data is overlooked.
Another aspect of spending that needs to be examined is how researchers approach the
data used to measure police spending and economic distress. Researchers need to account for
reporting issues when self-report data is used (Worrall, 2001; Worrall & Kovandzic, 2008;
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Phillips & Gayadeen, 2015; Lemos & Minzner, 2013; Holcomb et al., 2018; Mello, 2019). As we
see in Carpenter II et al., (2015) study when the Institute of Justice looked at how police reported
expenditures of civil and criminal asset forfeiture dollars, it was unclear what police were using
the funds for. This was due to the use of broad categories or altogether meaningless categories
such as “other.” In sum, there is reason to expect that city budgets that report police expenditures
could be missing data. They may also use categories that do not explain what expenditures are
for due to their being too broad or being non-descript categories like “other.” In addition to this,
there is also the potential for inaccurate reporting (Worrall, 2001; Worrall & Kovandzic, 2008;
Phillips & Gayadeen, 2015; Lemos & Minzner, 2013; Holcomb et al., 2018; Mello, 2019).
History of economic systems of abuse. In Camps 1 ,2, and 3, social, political and
historical contexts are not addressed, leaving out any discussion of the emergence of PFP tactics.
One example of this can be seen in Harvey and Henricks (2017), which discusses the rise in
monetary punishment use after 1977 but does not examine when the practice of fining civil or
criminal offences started. Looking at Riley (2019), we see civil infractions, as well as municipal
infractions came about in 1978. So, while expanded use of monetary punishment is explored the
social political and historical context of their creation is taken for granted (Harvey and Henricks
2017; Henricks, 2019; Riley, 2019).
America has a long history of using the criminal justice system in combination with
economic structures to preserve and promote racialized oppression. This history is especially
relevant as the American criminal justice system has not been reformed in a way that prevents it
from being used as a system of oppression. To the contrary, American criminal justice has grown
exponentially and its reach has been expanded into most, if not all social institutions (Alexander,
2012; Davis, 2017; Vitale, 2017). This oppression has taken many forms including Black codes,
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created following the end of the civil war. Black codes allowed southern Whites to use the
criminal justice system to maintain racial hierarchy at the end of the 19th century. This system
also incorporated a plethora of finable offenses and restrictions only applicable to the newly
freed, and quickly problematized Black Americans, after the civil war. Furthermore, it was the
police that were used to enforce these policies and strategies aimed at maintaining white
supremacy and racial subordination. Black codes tasked law enforcement with menacing and
controlling Black populations and would go on to shape contemporary criminal justice policy
and logic (Stevenson, 2017).
At the same time, there has been a history in the U.S. of failing to protect vulnerable
populations from business interests. For example, in the case of convict leasing the state was able
to continue to benefit from forced labor after slavery was made illegal using the 13th
amendments clause that made slavery an applicable punishment for “criminals.” As such, state
and local convict labor was sold to private interests for state profit. Such an arrangement led to
economic gain for the state and the private sector. In contrast for Blacks, this arrangement was
politically disempowering and entailed forced labor and harsh, frequently deadly working
conditions. Most importantly, Stevenson (2017) pointed out while the Civil Rights Act of 1964
had provisions designed to eliminate discrimination in voting, education, and employment, there
were no provisions to address discrimination in the criminal justice system. Problematic as the
criminal justice system has been an engine of racial subjugation and terror in America.
Findings indicate these abuses continue to this day (Davis, 2017). Stevenson (2017)
explains that other nations have histories of oppression and human rights atrocities such as
Germany, Rwanda, and South Africa, but unlike these other nations, the U.S. has not been able
to publicly acknowledge and address its history of racial violence and abuse carried out using the
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criminal justice system. There has also been no public reconciliation regarding issues like
criminal justice actors permitting White violence following the civil war. Because of this lack of
public acknowledgement of both the misinformation produced/promoted and the violence carried
out using this system, racial myths and misunderstandings also go unaddressed. Thus, issues
such as the presumptions about Black criminality, implicit bias, and a lower perception of
legitimacy among minority groups persist into the present day.
While black men and boys seem to be the most impacted by criminal justice activities.
These harms are not exclusive to black people and black communities (Davis 2017). Historical
and contemporary issues of abuse are also well documented in other populations and remain
largely unresolved . These groups include poor or homeless citizens, various minority
populations such as blacks and latinx populations, and LGBTQ+ communities (Fuqua & Sloan,
2005; Teague, 2011; Durán, 2013; Eisen, 2014; Linnemann et al., 2014; Anderson, 2015; Buist
and Lenning, 2015; Leovy, 2015; Davis, 2017; Herbert & Beckett, 2017; Lopez, 2019).

Conclusion
As this examination illustrated, presently there is a need for additional research on the
role of capital in policing. To make gains in understanding, methodology needs to overcome
three pitfalls. First, because previous studies seemed to find varied causes of PFP, a broader data
set needs to be captured to avoid drawing conclusions based on a partial understanding of the
larger system of PFP. Some of these studies concluded PFP was a result of distressed
departments, others concluded PFP was a repackaged attempt to achieve/maintain social control
(Henricks, 2019; Holcomb et al., 2018; Phillips & Gayadeen, 2015; Stuart, 2016; Teague, 2016;
Worrall, 2001). To address these disparate findings, studies need to avoid looking at PFP with
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too narrow a lens. In cases when such a lens is used, it seems studies lack validity (Creswell,
2018). Second, there is a need to synthesize a broader set of historical findings into future studies
to contextualize research. At present, it appears many studies ignore America's long history of
using state institutions for racial discrimination. This omission limits theorization as well as
historical contextual understanding. In addition, the possibility of intentional officer, department,
or even city-wide abuse of economic structures that go beyond motivations of economic gain are
largely absent, despite the multitude of sources documenting abuse using economic structures
(Du Bois, 1903; Alexander, 2012; Davis 2017). Third, there is significant evidence of PFP being
applied in a biased fashion in order to target “problem populations” while ignoring affluent
citizens or allowing them to avoid harm even when they come in contact with the system. In
these cases, it seems what is being carried out is more akin to policing using profit to vail actual
intentions. Thus, there seems to be a correlation between PFP and local examples reminiscent of
Wacquant’s centaur state (Holder, 2015; Wacquant, 2012). In this way, neoliberalism seems to
inform shifts in ways that are still not understood by academia.
External validity. To capture relevant aspects of PFP, such as impact on people,
potential for social control, benefits of control, and benefactors of control, research should use a
framework broad enough to capture necessary data but should also ask precise questions of the
data. This is because the various elements of the phenomenon, the parties, and populations
affected are not being captured. When looking at Holder (2015) or Carpenter II et al. (2015), it is
clear there is a lot going on at the street level and national level that is not being captured. In
studies like Worrall (2001) or Holcomb et al. (2018), they claim to be examining the
implications of the invasion of profit motives into policing, but only really consider the impact
on police themselves. In order to overcome issues of external validity, future studies need to seek
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out methodology that produces contextualized findings. For instance, in the study by Holcomb et
al (2018), the impact on citizens is not accounted for. When officers seize assets, they are taking
them from people. Because of the involvement of people and the deprivation of their property
there is a motivation to engage in this activity that could go beyond the pursuit of economic
capital. As with black codes, fines were a part of the practice, but the goal was not just to get
capital, but rather to maintain racial supremacy (Davis, 2017). Still, if a study were to look at the
impact of black codes by just looking at the reports of state actors, they may miss the social
impact, harms, and abuses inherent to the practice. Certain elements of policing will not be
captured by looking to the state actors that carry out the tasks alone. Like other criminal justice
activities, PFP needs to be researched by talking to the people being policed and by observing
state actors (Du Bois, 1903; Wacquant, 2008; Durán, 2013; Lopez 2019).
Historically competent research. Historical context needs to be introduced into the
framework of future PFP research. For instance, policing remains largely unreformed from its
problematic 1960’s formation (Alexander, 2012; Davis, 2017; Vitale, 2017). Yet in
contemporary studies, political issues are frequently treated as though they have been resolved
despite a lack of evidence of such a shift. In this way, whatever is being researched is treated as a
new phenomenon resulting from a recent issue. For example, in Worrall (2001), it was the drug
war that had led to increases in forfeiture, but the racialized nature and political goals of the war
on drugs was omitted. Also, in Holcomb et al. (2018), it was the recession that led to shifts in
policing. Perhaps there are other factors leading into the rises and falls of forfeiture. Henricks
(2019) discusses the construction of race neutral policy, and as we saw in Stevenson (2017),
there have also been non-race neutral policies. Taking this history into account one alternative
explanation for rises and falls in exploitative criminal justice and PFP activity could be, when
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race neutral policy was being created PFP activity could not take place, leading to decreases. In
this same way, contemporary PFP rises could be better understood by looking at them as a point
when the state adapted new policy to allow for continuation of previous exploitative activity that
relied on overtly racist language. According to Wacquant (2012), this is what we should expect,
a political project that is plural and adaptive, with strategies able to subvert barriers such as
constitutional protections and court rulings. Unfortunately, many studies seem to be ahistorical
or only go back a few years or decades. This may be because, as Stevenson (2017) found, the
U.S. has not been able to acknowledge and address its history of racial violence and abuse
carried out using the criminal justice system. Nor has the country acknowledge how criminal
justice actors were permitted to inflict race-based violence and terror following the civil war and
how this history contributed to present issues, such as, the presumed guilt of Black Americans,
the assumed innocence of police, implicit racial bias, institutionalized racism, and historically
strained relations between police and minority groups.
PFP goals. The disproportionate impact of PFP policy on poor citizens, as well as the
focus on low level offenses, are reason to refrain from taking PFP at face value (Holder, 2015;
Stuart, 2016; Henricks 2019). If the purpose of policing for profit is to balance budgets or raise
capital, this seems problematic due to the potential for net widening. These measures are often
punitive with conditions that exacerbate the chances of entering or staying in the system drawing
increasing numbers of individuals into the criminal justice system that would otherwise be left
alone or dealt with informally (Stuart, 2016; Teague, 2016). In these cases, if the goal was to
reduce criminal justice costs at the city level, then these endeavors seem prone to failure due to
their shortsightedness, as they do not seem to account for potential costs of incarcerating
individuals that cannot pay fines and fees. There are also varied social harms that frequently
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accompany PFP (Holder, 2015; Stuart, 2016). If instead we look at what PFP actually
accomplishes, specifically lowering the threshold for state intervention, putting more individuals
under supervision, and moving public services to the private sector, then something like pay only
probation can be seen as an effective, though not necessarily profitable, form of social control
that uses a need for money or the desire to hold individuals financially accountable as the pretext
for state intervention. When we look at Holder (2015), it was clear that the municipal police
force was able to act in tandem with the cities’ goals in a way that produced a polarized social
order that entailed terrorizing and extorting the majority Black population. Seeing the criminal
justice system mobilized in this way demands expansion of theorization. As this paper has
argued, there is significant evidence of PFP being applied in a biased fashion in order to target
“problem populations.” At the same time, PFP tactics seem to be able to ignore affluent citizens
or allow them to avoid harm even when they meet the criminal justice system. In these cases, it
seems what is being carried out is more akin to policing using profit to vail actual intentions.
Thus, there seems to be a correlation between PFP and local examples that are reminiscent of the
Wacquant (2012) centaur state (Holder, 2015). In this way, neoliberalism seems to be involved
in shifts and should be considered moving forward. Due to the multitude of similarities to the
Wacquant (2012) theorization of the neoliberal project that seem to be involved in revenue
policing, it seems appropriate to apply the Wacquant (2012) theory as described in camp 4.

Future Research
Future research on policing for profit could benefit from employing mixed methodology
instead of relying on one source of data such as a survey to capture the many elements of the
phenomenon. As we saw, while no study captured PFP perfectly, certain research attempts
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painted a more nuanced picture than the one-dimensional findings of other studies that looked at
policing for profit. Historical data on the area being policed should be collected as well as
information on the organizations involved in policing efforts. This should be combined with data
on the populations being impacted by the practices. As revenue may only be the avenue through
which police intervention is being justified.
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